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> the X11 protocol [...] has plenty of design decisions that simply cannot be secured. I've been hearing this for over a decade now. I don't get it. Just bec

> the X11 protocol [...] has plenty of design decisions that simply cannot be secured. I've been hearing this for over a decade now. I don't get it. Just because xorg currently makes different clients aware of each other and broadcasts keypresses and mouse movements to all clients and allows screen capturing doesn't mean it has to. You could essentially give every application the impression that they are the only thing running. It might seem difficult to implement, but compare it to the effort that has gone into wayland across the whole ecosystem. Maybe that was the point - motivating people to work on X was too difficult, and the wayland approach manages to diffuse the work out to more people. I was really bullish on Wayland 10 years ago. Not so much any more. In retrospect it seems like a failure in technical leadership.

uecker 2y ago
X always had the capability to isolate clients, but it is not used it would need some work which nobody does because of Wayland.
- welterde 2y ago
  Some aspects of the client isolation are used by default when doing X11 forwarding via SSH. A remote keylogger will not work for instance.
yencabulator 2y ago
It'll be challenging to even figure out which one of the things connecting to $DISPLAY is the real window manager. Good luck on your lonely[1] journey! [1]: The people who actually developed Xorg are now working on various Wayland-related things.
- wmanley 2y ago
  > It'll be challenging to even figure out which one of the things connecting to $DISPLAY is the real window manager. I suspect it would be less challenging than writing a whole new wayland server. Off the top of my head, I'd use a separate abstract domain socket for the window manager including some UUID, and then pass that to the window manager when launching it. You could create these sockets on demand - one for each security context. On linux typically a different security contexts will either have different UIDs - in which case filesystem permissions would be sufficient - or they have different mount namespaces - in which case you make different sockets visible in different namespaces. For SSH forwarding you could have SSH ask the X server for a new socket for forwarding purposes - so remote clients can't snoop on local clients. > Good luck on your lonely[1] journey! > > [1]: The people who actually developed Xorg are now working on various Wayland-related things. This is what I mean by a failure of technical leadership.
  - tankenmate 2y ago
    "You could create these sockets on demand - one for each security context. On linux typically a different security contexts will either have different UIDs - in which case filesystem permissions would be sufficient - or they have different mount namespaces - in which case you make different sockets visible in different namespaces." This is reminiscent of how Trusted Solaris[0] implements Mandatory Access Control (MAC) a la Orange Book[1]. [0] https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris10/overview/ds-ts8-150124.pdf https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris10/... [1] https://public.milcyber.org/activities/magazine/articles/2021/renda-the-orange-book https://public.milcyber.org/activities/magazine/articles/202...
  - welterde 2y ago
    > For SSH forwarding you could have SSH ask the X server for a new socket for forwarding purposes - so remote clients can't snoop on local clients. SSH pretty much already does this. Per default (using -X) X11 forwarding is in untrusted mode, which makes certain unsafe X11 extensions unavailable. So remote clients already cannot snoop the whole keyboard input.
  - yencabulator 2y ago
    > Off the top of my head, I'd use a separate abstract domain socket for the window manager including some UUID, and then pass that to the window manager when launching it. And then the window manager spawns whatever programs the user wants, and they end up sharing that $DISPLAY.
    - wmanley 2y ago
      I'm not trying to claim that X is secure as is. The claim I'm making is: 1. There is nothing fundamentally insecure about the design of X that couldn't be fixed with a bit of effort. 2. The effort required would be significantly less than what has gone into Wayland over the last 16 years. Fixing the security of the system certainly would involve changes to more than just xorg. Anywhere there is a security boundary you'd need to make modifications - but that's OK, most of these security boundaries are younger than wayland anyway. This discussion of $DISPLAY seems like distracting minutiae. Sure it's a medium size problem that would need solving, but that's all it is. To address your specific point: it could be the responsibility of the window manager to set $DISPLAY to a less powerful socket when starting processes. Ultimately it doesn't matter though, because if the display server isn't doing some sort of sandboxing then the spawned process can just ptrace xorg and do whatever it wants. X being secure only matters in the presence of a security boundary and in that case it would be the responsibility of whatever is setting up that boundary to create a less privileged socket. Whether that be ssh or flatpak or whatever.
fsflover 2y ago
> You could essentially give every application the impression that they are the only thing running. > It might seem difficult to implement This is exactly what OS did (my daily driver): https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/inter-vm-keyboard-isolation/31537 https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/inter-vm-keyboard-isolation/315...

uecker 2y ago

X always had the capability to isolate clients, but it is not used it would need some work which nobody does because of Wayland.

welterde 2y ago
Some aspects of the client isolation are used by default when doing X11 forwarding via SSH. A remote keylogger will not work for instance.

yencabulator 2y ago

It'll be challenging to even figure out which one of the things connecting to $DISPLAY is the real window manager. Good luck on your lonely[1] journey! [1]: The people who actually developed Xorg are now working on various Wayland-related things.

wmanley 2y ago
> It'll be challenging to even figure out which one of the things connecting to $DISPLAY is the real window manager. I suspect it would be less challenging than writing a whole new wayland server. Off the top of my head, I'd use a separate abstract domain socket for the window manager including some UUID, and then pass that to the window manager when launching it. You could create these sockets on demand - one for each security context. On linux typically a different security contexts will either have different UIDs - in which case filesystem permissions would be sufficient - or they have different mount namespaces - in which case you make different sockets visible in different namespaces. For SSH forwarding you could have SSH ask the X server for a new socket for forwarding purposes - so remote clients can't snoop on local clients. > Good luck on your lonely[1] journey! > > [1]: The people who actually developed Xorg are now working on various Wayland-related things. This is what I mean by a failure of technical leadership.
- tankenmate 2y ago
  "You could create these sockets on demand - one for each security context. On linux typically a different security contexts will either have different UIDs - in which case filesystem permissions would be sufficient - or they have different mount namespaces - in which case you make different sockets visible in different namespaces." This is reminiscent of how Trusted Solaris[0] implements Mandatory Access Control (MAC) a la Orange Book[1]. [0] https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris10/overview/ds-ts8-150124.pdf https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris10/... [1] https://public.milcyber.org/activities/magazine/articles/2021/renda-the-orange-book https://public.milcyber.org/activities/magazine/articles/202...
- welterde 2y ago
  > For SSH forwarding you could have SSH ask the X server for a new socket for forwarding purposes - so remote clients can't snoop on local clients. SSH pretty much already does this. Per default (using -X) X11 forwarding is in untrusted mode, which makes certain unsafe X11 extensions unavailable. So remote clients already cannot snoop the whole keyboard input.
- yencabulator 2y ago
  > Off the top of my head, I'd use a separate abstract domain socket for the window manager including some UUID, and then pass that to the window manager when launching it. And then the window manager spawns whatever programs the user wants, and they end up sharing that $DISPLAY.
  - wmanley 2y ago
    I'm not trying to claim that X is secure as is. The claim I'm making is: 1. There is nothing fundamentally insecure about the design of X that couldn't be fixed with a bit of effort. 2. The effort required would be significantly less than what has gone into Wayland over the last 16 years. Fixing the security of the system certainly would involve changes to more than just xorg. Anywhere there is a security boundary you'd need to make modifications - but that's OK, most of these security boundaries are younger than wayland anyway. This discussion of $DISPLAY seems like distracting minutiae. Sure it's a medium size problem that would need solving, but that's all it is. To address your specific point: it could be the responsibility of the window manager to set $DISPLAY to a less powerful socket when starting processes. Ultimately it doesn't matter though, because if the display server isn't doing some sort of sandboxing then the spawned process can just ptrace xorg and do whatever it wants. X being secure only matters in the presence of a security boundary and in that case it would be the responsibility of whatever is setting up that boundary to create a less privileged socket. Whether that be ssh or flatpak or whatever.

fsflover 2y ago

> You could essentially give every application the impression that they are the only thing running. > It might seem difficult to implement This is exactly what OS did (my daily driver): https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/inter-vm-keyboard-isolation/31537 https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/inter-vm-keyboard-isolation/315...