5 ms·
Susctl CVE-2024-54507: A particularly 'sus' sysctl in the XNU kernel
- nxobject 2y agoDid you get a bounty payout for this? I got the impression that Apple wasn't particularly on the ball with those.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- ChocolateGod 2y agoIs it even exploitable in the real world? Correct me if I'm wrong but you get 2 bytes of kernel data (potentially blank padding) and the same two bytes each time?
- bean-weevil 2y agoIf the linker puts a pointer there, this would let you leak part of the pointer which could let you bypass kaslr. Not too likely for that to occur. If I were submitting this bug I would feel complete if they bought me a sandwich.
- axoltl 2y agoThe bottom 2 bytes of a pointer contain two bits of the slide, assuming it's even a pointer into the kernelcache itself. I'd take half a sandwich.
- the-rc 2y agoLittle endianness considered harmful
- bean-weevil 2y agoYeah, you could probably contrive a situation where you get more interesting information (page numbers maybe?), but it definitely doesn't seem likely to me-
- buzzergfxkjkl 2y agoGood to find the bug regardless! I appreciated the succinct and not overly dramatic write-up. I don't think anything significant was claimed other than the fact that it is a kernel bug (which is significant in itself don't get me wrong).
- duskwuff 2y agoYou are correct. It's clearly a bug, but the impact in shipping kernels appears to be limited to "leaking" some non-sensitive data.
- inetknght 2y ago- int new_value = *(int *)oidp->oid_arg1; + int new_value = *(uint16_t *)oidp->oid_arg1; Why not just have `uint16_t new_value = ...`? Ahh, because `new_value` is being given to `sysctl_handle_int(..., &new_value, ...);` which of course expects an `int`. So then it begs the question: if the value is really a `uint16_t`, then why is it being handled through a plain `int`? It smells like there could easily be tons of other memory-safety and/or type confusion problems endemic to the sysctl API.
- aritashion 2y ago> So then it begs the question: if the value is really a `uint16_t`, then why is it being handled through a plain `int`? I don't think it begs the question, but it does raise one!
- cbarrick 2y agoNit: "begs the question" means "raises the question" in many contemporary colloquial contexts. It can _also_ refer to a type of logical fallacy in philosophical contexts. The phrase can be confusing because of its overloaded definitions, so it's best to avoid it. But if you understood what someone meant when they used it, then... you understood it's meaning. Remember to treat the study of language descriptively rather than prescriptively! https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/beg_the_question https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/beg_the_question
- bmacho 2y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question
- kccqzy 2y agoWell there's the so-called usual arithmetic conversions that will basically convert every uint16_t to an unsigned int. The C and C++ languages do a silent conversion on your back anyways so you might as well make it explicit.
- 2y ago
- nixpulvis 2y agoSeems like something to be integration tested in the future. Honestly surprised this slipped through.
- 0x457 2y agoI saw that types are different, but I was thinking "must be some weird C thing that I don't know about"
- StressedDev 2y agoI am not surprised. First, it's a subtle bug. Second, in C/C++. a lot of times you get unlucky when reading uninitialized memory. Basically, the bug does not occur when you test the code on your machine or when you run the automated tests. Another problem is writing good automated tests is hard and often skipped. Lots of software engineering teams talk about the wonders of automated tests. Unfortunately, many automated tests are not very good and either do not ensure the major functionality works or just do not test some of the code. There are also limits to how much time a software engineer has to test. No one can test everything. Basically, I am not surprised developers make mistakes and I am not surprised the tests either did not catch this mistake or even did not exist. Software is very hard and software engineers are far from perfect.
- rvz 2y ago[flagged]
- zx8080 2y agoIt's not possible to apply human morale and principles to companies. It just does not work that way. Why would they pay if no profit if pay and they are not forced to pay?
- Kenji 2y ago[dead]
- emptiestplace 2y agoTo inspire more of the same.
- readyplayernull 2y agoDo not fall into the trap of anthropomorphising Apple
- bramhaag 2y agoIdeally Apple would incentivise people reporting security issues to them, instead of risking people selling them to someone else who pays more.
- wilg 2y agoIs there any reason to assume a conspiracy and drama around the bounty here other that just being bored and cynical? Apple has a well known security bounty program https://security.apple.com/bounty/ https://security.apple.com/bounty/
- rvz 2y agoSo the researcher didn't get a bounty from Apple then, no?
- 2y ago
- soheil 2y agoLeaking two random bytes and in some cases just padding bytes to user space is not the end of the world and I don't get why there are so many negative comments blaming Apple for not handing out a handsome bounty for this bug.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- StressedDev 2y agoIt's still a security bug. Often, multiple bugs like this are chained together to create one very nasty exploit. I agree that this bug probably does not deserve a massive payout, but I think $3,000-5,000$ is appropriate.
- loeg 2y agoYou're joking. This is a $10 bug.
- dizhn 2y agoDammit I gave a kid $20 in amazon books credit for "your site has a phpinfo() page".
- worthless-trash 2y agoYou got had !
- exe34 2y agokid probably put it there :-D
- yapyap 2y agoI appreciate the among us.
- jfasi 2y agoInterestingly, ChatGPT correctly points out this exact issue: https://chatgpt.com/share/6793a2d1-5f84-8006-8e78-16be4d49083b https://chatgpt.com/share/6793a2d1-5f84-8006-8e78-16be4d4908...
- kwitaszczyk 2y agoThis is a nice and easy to understand example of a memory-safety bug that CHERI [1] prevents (among other classes of vulnerabilities). Given that the SYSCTL_PROC() macro installs a pointer to an uint16_t value in the oid_arg1 field, a CHERI pure-capability kernel would construct a capability with bounds set to sizeof(uint16_t) and later the dereference of (int *)oidp->oid_arg1 in sysctl_udp_log_port() would trigger a capability bounds violation. `sysctl -a` would simply crash on CHERI allowing a developer to catch this without KASAN being involved. [1] http://cheri-cpu.org http://cheri-cpu.org
- pjmlp 2y agoNot only, SPARC ADI and ARM MTE as well.