3 ms·
TLS doesn’t matter for End-to-end encrypted stuff though, you could exchange the data over Telnet and it would still be secure. The content itself is already en
by echoangle 2y ago
TLS doesn’t matter for End-to-end encrypted stuff though, you could exchange the data over Telnet and it would still be secure. The content itself is already encrypted before being transmitted and can only be decrypted by the receiver.
- kijin 2y agoAFAIK the attack described by OP only works if the attacker knows the (randomly generated) URL of the image, which probably means they have a Signal client that can decrypt the image already. So the secrecy of the content is not at issue. The question is whether some specific person has received the same image, and from where.
- chatmasta 2y agoPart of his attack requires disabling the cache on his (sender) side so that he doesn’t pollute the cache. That implies that both sides of the conversation share the same URL, which means Cloudflare could assume two IP addresses requesting the same URL on the Signal attachment domain are participating in a shared conversation.
- kijin 2y agoYeah, that's a problem. It is leaking metadata, not content. Ideally, the image should be padded, encrypted with a different key, and given a different URL for each user who is authorized to view it. But this would increase the client's burden significantly, especially in conversations that include more than two people.