4 ms·
The contrary view is based on dicta in the Slaughterhouse Cases, decided less than a decade after the 14th amendment: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/u
by rayiner 2y ago
The contrary view is based on dicta in the Slaughterhouse Cases, decided less than a decade after the 14th amendment: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/83/36/ https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/83/36/
> All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
> The first observation we have to make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, "subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.
- joshuamorton 2y agoI'm (legitimately) curious: how does one square the concept of not being subject to US jurisdiction for citizenship purposes, with being subject to US jurisdiction for law enforcement purposes? In all other exceptions to the 14th amendment, either you are dealing with an invading army, or you are dealing with people who have diplomatic immunity, all cases where they are not subject to American Civil law (and law enforcement). So how does the court thread the needle to allow law enforcement to interact with folks who it is claiming are not subject to US jurisdiction?
- rayiner 2y agoIt’s not obvious to me that “jurisdiction” could only mean “law enforcement jurisdiction” in 1868. Wong Kim Ark cited Schooner Exchange, which explained that nations have absolute jurisdiction over persons on their territory. It framed the cases you’re talking about, those having diplomatic immunity, as being a waiver of jurisdiction that was customary under international law.
- dctoedt 2y agoAs has been noted in other responses to you: Dicta are just that, dicta. Moreover, the Reconstruction-era Slaughterhouse Cases arose in the context of the defeated South's often-violent, century-long attempts to preserve "states' rights" (read: white supremacy). Limiting the reach of the 14th Amendment was one facet of that project; Louisiana's lawyer in the case was a prominent opponent of Reconstruction. The Court's 5-4 judgment has long since been shitcanned [0]; in the modern era it's palpably frivolous to cite its dicta as support. In any event: Longstanding actual practice has followed the conventional interpretation of "subject to the jurisdiction"; see, e.g., former British prime minister Boris Johnson, who was born in NYC to British citizens and thus had to pay U.S.-citizen taxes until he renounced his citizenship. [1] Finally, as has also been noted: No sane person would assert with a straight face that a suspected thief, murderer, or unsafe driver was immune from arrest and prosecution in the U.S., merely because s/he happened to be born in the U.S. to undocumented parents and therefore was supposedly not "subject to the jurisdiction." [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slaughter-House_Cases#Analysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slaughter-House_Cases#Analysis [1] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/08/boris-johnson-renounces-us-citizenship-record-2016-uk-foreign-secretary https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/08/boris-johns...
- rayiner 2y agoThe Slaughterhouse Cases were decided just five years after the enactment of the 14th amendment, and the judgment is obviously correct and has never been overruled. And the dissent was obviously nuts in suggesting that the 14th amendment protected butchers from state economic regulation.
- dctoedt 2y agoI'll confess error in my wording above (and it's too late to edit it): The judgment (outcome) was arguably correct, as you say — state governments should indeed be able to do reasonable public-safety regulation. (Whether Louisiana's action in granting a private monopoly on meat processing was a reasonable way to promote public safety was another question: The Court's opinion focused on the 14th Amendment and federal privileges and immunities vs. those under state law.) The 5-4 majority's rationale went too far: As the opinion says, the Reconstruction Amendments (13 through 15) were intended to hem in state governments — notably but not exclusively those of the South, which by and large were dominated (often through murderous mob- and militia violence) by white, racist, recent- and still-aspiring enslavers — but the majority left the door too open to the possibility of states'-rights arguments. [0] [0] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/83/36/ https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/83/36/