There are two issues here, I think. One is intentional leakage, or trusting the vendor to be "not evil". Here you are right - as you mentioned in another comme

There are two issues here, I think. One is intentional leakage, or trusting the vendor to be "not evil". Here you are right - as you mentioned in another comment, there is no easy way for users to "police" the vendor of JS crypto. I do not see, however, how this is different from users trusting other vendors of auto-updating software. You can probably argue that OSS pieces such as Linux and FF have this "policing" enabled through source code availability. But there are many closed-source vendors (Microsoft, Google, anti-virus vendors) that many users trust. If you don't trust the companies mentioned above, then yes, you should not trust aes.io and other JS-crypto based vendors. But if a user has Microsoft/Apple updates enabled, and browsers (other than FF) auto-updating on their systems, etc., then this becomes a question of vendor being "not evil", not weaknesses of JS crypto, and as such somewhat out of scope of scrictly "JS crypto - yes or no" discussion. The second issue here are unintentional leaks and breaches. Read-only breaches, for example, become more or less non-issue with JS crypto, because stealing properly encrypted data is not that useful. And there are probably orders of magnitude more read-only breaches than read-write, simply because inside companies more people have read-only access to production data than read-write access. Thus JS crypto seems to help substantially reduce the risk of unintentional compromises. The second issue needs more attention and discussion from the technical point of view, I agree, and I am open to it. The first issue, however, becomes "I trust this vendor but I don't trust that vendor", and this is not a discussion that I believe can be productive here and now.