I understand your question, and in many ways you're correct; that said, let's say you have stored XSS in some obscure parameter of your web application. One wa

I understand your question, and in many ways you're correct; that said, let's say you have stored XSS in some obscure parameter of your web application. One way to exploit the Victim via XSS would be to convince them to browse to the compromised section of the site. Sometimes, that's as simple as getting them to click on a malformed URL -- basically, the same vector as getting them to click on your CSRF-ized link, anyway. Many applications, however, don't have direct URLs to certain areas of the app. It could be hidden by Javascript/AJAX population, or written in a language/framework that doesn't support that kind of direct linking. Therefore, if some kind of sensitive function is easily owned by CSRF (say, account.php?sendto=Eve), but the XSS is stored someplace obscure that might not be available via public URL (browse to Accounts -> Details -> My Bio, which populates dynamically), the higher threat severity would be the CSRF. Sorry this turned kind of long, but I deal with a lot of webapp security issues on a day-to-day basis and feel relatively qualified to answer this one in some depth :)