>The most important aspect of this work is that it (seemingly) establishes a new cryptographic primitive that completely removes the danger of rubber-hose crypt

>The most important aspect of this work is that it (seemingly) establishes a new cryptographic primitive that completely removes the danger of rubber-hose cryptanalysis — i.e. obtaining passkeys via torture or coercion. Does not compute. If there is a mechanism by which you can authenticate, you can be coerced into authenticating through that method. The paper covers this of course: >Coercion detection. Since our aim is to prevent users from effectively transmitting the ability to authenticate to others, there remains an attack where an adversary coerces a user to authenticate while they are under adversary control. It is possible to reduce the effectiveness of this technique if the system could detect if the user is under duress. I take issue with the the article suggesting it's completely resistant to coercion. A system that detects duress... interesting I guess but seems like a stretch. >This equates to around 38 bits of entropy, which is thousands/millions of times more secure than your average, memorable password. Really? Playing around with KeePass briefly, it seems this is comparable to a 6 character password that includes upper, lower, numeric, and special characters. I wouldn't consider that very strong. Besides the fact that it appears you're not entering the password exactly, but only (if I'm understanding correctly) "good enough".