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> The Americans knew that NATO expansion into Ukraine could provoke Russian intervention Its true that NATO (not just the US) understood that as a Russian conc

> The Americans knew that NATO expansion into Ukraine could provoke Russian intervention Its true that NATO (not just the US) understood that as a Russian concern, and that’s why they acceded to Russia’s demand not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008. Leading immediately to Russia invading Georgia in 2008, and then invading Ukraine – who had no active efforts on either the Ukraine or NATO side toward NATO membership – in 2014, immediately after Ukraine threw out the Russia-aligned government that had taken over while Russia was militarily occupied in Georgia (unsurprisingly, this invasion led to a renewed Ukrainian interest in NATO membership.) But given the actual sequence of events, its pretty hard to claim that NATO expansion in Ukraine – which literally was not progressing until after the 2014 invasion – lead to Russian intervention in Ukraine. In fact, both 2008 and 2014 events support the idea that the reason that Russia was concerned about NATO expansion in Georgia and Ukraine is that it would complicate their existing intent to intervene in those countries with or without NATO involvement.

protomolecule 2y ago
>that’s why they acceded to Russia’s demand not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008 They did something worse: While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow. <...> Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!” <...> Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward. Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.” After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel agreed to delete “one day” <...> <...> British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO.” The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit. <...> Moscow’s very public goal had of course been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members. That had never happened before. <...> The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete. He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is not based on promises.” [0] [0] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/0230617735 https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...
- marcusverus 2y ago
  Yep. See point 23 from the Bucharest Summit Declaration. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm
protomolecule 2y ago
>Leading immediately to Russia invading Georgia in 2008 Encouraging Saakashvili to resolve Georgia's territorial issues by taking over breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And then Russian intervened. [0] >who had no active efforts on either the Ukraine or NATO side toward NATO membership The efforts were quite active during pro-Western president's rule and were halted by pro-Ukrainian president. >Ukraine threw out the Russia-aligned government No, Yanukovich was thrown out by pro-Western coup 'mid-wifed' by the US. [1] "The night before the clashes, Right Sector called on all of its members to ready themselves for a "peace offensive" on 18 February. <...> That morning, around 20,000 demonstrators marched on the parliament building as that body was set to consider opposition demands for a new constitution and government. Around 09:45, the demonstrators broke through the police barricade of several personnel-transport trucks near the building of the Central Officers' Club of Ukraine and pushed the cordon of police aside. The clashes started after some two dozen demonstrators moved a police vehicle blocking their path to parliament." [2] Right Sector is "the right-wing, paramilitary confederation of several ultranationalist organizations" [3] [0] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/georgia-started-war-with-russia-eu-backed-report-idUSTRE58T4MO/ https://www.reuters.com/article/world/georgia-started-war-wi... [1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity#Protest_march_and_initial_clashes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity#Protest_... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_Sector https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_Sector

protomolecule 2y ago

>that’s why they acceded to Russia’s demand not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008 They did something worse: While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow. <...> Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!” <...> Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward. Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.” After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel agreed to delete “one day” <...> <...> British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO.” The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit. <...> Moscow’s very public goal had of course been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members. That had never happened before. <...> The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete. He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is not based on promises.” [0] [0] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/0230617735 https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...

marcusverus 2y ago
Yep. See point 23 from the Bucharest Summit Declaration. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

protomolecule 2y ago

>Leading immediately to Russia invading Georgia in 2008 Encouraging Saakashvili to resolve Georgia's territorial issues by taking over breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And then Russian intervened. [0] >who had no active efforts on either the Ukraine or NATO side toward NATO membership The efforts were quite active during pro-Western president's rule and were halted by pro-Ukrainian president. >Ukraine threw out the Russia-aligned government No, Yanukovich was thrown out by pro-Western coup 'mid-wifed' by the US. [1] "The night before the clashes, Right Sector called on all of its members to ready themselves for a "peace offensive" on 18 February. <...> That morning, around 20,000 demonstrators marched on the parliament building as that body was set to consider opposition demands for a new constitution and government. Around 09:45, the demonstrators broke through the police barricade of several personnel-transport trucks near the building of the Central Officers' Club of Ukraine and pushed the cordon of police aside. The clashes started after some two dozen demonstrators moved a police vehicle blocking their path to parliament." [2] Right Sector is "the right-wing, paramilitary confederation of several ultranationalist organizations" [3] [0] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/georgia-started-war-with-russia-eu-backed-report-idUSTRE58T4MO/ https://www.reuters.com/article/world/georgia-started-war-wi... [1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity#Protest_march_and_initial_clashes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity#Protest_... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_Sector https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_Sector