4 ms·
The issue is that any memory readable by a software directly has some kind of risks, including SRAM. Here is something something you might find interesting: htt
by zebra_bong3 2y ago
The issue is that any memory readable by a software directly has some kind of risks, including SRAM. Here is something something you might find interesting: https://forte-research.com/UnTrustZone/ https://forte-research.com/UnTrustZone/ There is no absolute security, but keeping secure memory away from software provides much better solution.
- mjg59 2y agoJust have the CPU microcode clear SRAM whenever the CPU is booted
- zebra_bong3 2y agoThat is what that paper says. No cpu does that.
- cyberax 2y agoTrustZone is not a great solution here, the decryption needs to be fast, and this really means that the key should be directly accessible to the kernel. Having it only inside the cache SRAM mitigates all the offline attacks. SRAM immediately loses content on power disruption (its state is encoded in the current path, not in a capacitor charge). And it's trivial to completely and unconditionally erase on boot.