In practice this isn’t a very useful attack. You need hours of encrypted and unencrypted data and you can then only decrypt the encrypted transmissions of the t

In practice this isn’t a very useful attack. You need hours of encrypted and unencrypted data and you can then only decrypt the encrypted transmissions of the targeted node. The NSA if it knew about it most likely did disclosed the vulnerability, it was just deemed not significant enough to redesign, manufacture and re-issue millions of new radios. These radios aren’t rated for secret communications anyhow. By the time you manage to decrypt what you want the information would likely be stale since all of the information passed over radios will be tactical in nature at best. There are still other defenses like spread spectrum transmission and frequency hopping that make intercepts harder. The main threat model against radios isn’t actually message interception but rather basic SigInt that would be able to detect, identify and track transmissions. On the battlefield that’s the most useful intelligence you’ll get especially during war time. Any interception beyond that would take days if not weeks to be properly analyzed and disseminated this isn’t something that it done on a regiment or division levels.