3 ms·

I take your point about the trim wheels moving, though that is not a case of force feedback. More generally, it might be argued that Boeing's original intent wi

I take your point about the trim wheels moving, though that is not a case of force feedback. More generally, it might be argued that Boeing's original intent with MCAS was indeed to provide force feedback to the pilot via input controls to indicate, but not completely prevent, that the pilot is approaching or about to exceed flight control limits, but it did so by diverging from mapping pilot inputs to control surface outputs - so it hits both sides of your dichotomy. Furthermore, Boeing diverged further from mapping pilot inputs to control surface outputs once initial flight testing showed that the original version of MCAS was insufficiently effective to satisfy its purpose. In a fateful decision, Boeing chose to increase the power of MCAS to the point where it effectively became a stick-pusher at either high AofA or in the event of a single AofA sensor fault, while contriving to hide this from the FAA, pilots, and those who train pilots. This took any consideration of differences in design philosophy in a whole new (and much darker) direction. Most of the rest of what you say is broadly in agreement with what Radu094 wrote.

avianlyric 2y ago
> This took any consideration of differences in design philosophy in a whole new (and much darker) direction. Personally I consider the whole MCAS debacle a symptom of Boeings failure as an engineering organisation, and the prioritisation of commercial concerns above engineering concerns, rather than a change in philosophy. I still have the view that Boeing philosophy still deliberately leans towards putting the pilot in as close a link with physical plane as possible. Ultimately I don’t really have a view on which approach is “better”, but I do think Airbus and Boeing have very different philosophies regarding aircraft controls. Even if Boeing has become incapable of expressing its engineering philosophies competently. I think it’s still useful to compare and contrast the two approaches, and there’s still things to be learned from how each approach succeeds and fails in different scenarios.
- mannykannot 2y ago
  > I think it’s still useful to compare and contrast the two approaches, and there’s still things to be learned from how each approach succeeds and fails in different scenarios. That's a sound approach, though one should be wary of selectively dismissing evidence on the grounds that it does not fit with either one's own or commonly-held preconceived notions.

avianlyric 2y ago

> This took any consideration of differences in design philosophy in a whole new (and much darker) direction. Personally I consider the whole MCAS debacle a symptom of Boeings failure as an engineering organisation, and the prioritisation of commercial concerns above engineering concerns, rather than a change in philosophy. I still have the view that Boeing philosophy still deliberately leans towards putting the pilot in as close a link with physical plane as possible. Ultimately I don’t really have a view on which approach is “better”, but I do think Airbus and Boeing have very different philosophies regarding aircraft controls. Even if Boeing has become incapable of expressing its engineering philosophies competently. I think it’s still useful to compare and contrast the two approaches, and there’s still things to be learned from how each approach succeeds and fails in different scenarios.

mannykannot 2y ago
> I think it’s still useful to compare and contrast the two approaches, and there’s still things to be learned from how each approach succeeds and fails in different scenarios. That's a sound approach, though one should be wary of selectively dismissing evidence on the grounds that it does not fit with either one's own or commonly-held preconceived notions.