The revolution of Public Choice economics was to examine the incentives faced by actors in the public sector, instead of viewing public policy as exogenous to t

The revolution of Public Choice economics was to examine the incentives faced by actors in the public sector, instead of viewing public policy as exogenous to the economy as previous models have done. In the past, if economists discovered an inefficiency in the market, they would say "and the government should correct this inefficiency with policy X". Public choice economists don't ask if governments should do X, but rather will they do X. It turns out the incentives facing government actors aren't very good. They have much fewer incentives to act efficiently than market actors. It is possible to have competent officials at the head of a small bureaucracy produce good results. However, I doubt this is possible for the United States, which owns the largest bureaucracy in the world. So, there are real reasons for limiting the scope of government.