From the NTSB report: 2.3.3 Descent and Ditching Airspeed As noted, the flight crew was not able to initiate part 2 of the Engine Dual Failure checklist, whic

From the NTSB report: 2.3.3 Descent and Ditching Airspeed As noted, the flight crew was not able to initiate part 2 of the Engine Dual Failure checklist, which contained airspeed guidance for pilots to follow if an engine restart is considered impossible and a ditching is anticipated. The checklist states that, when an engine restart is considered impossible, the optimum airspeed at which to fly is the green dot speed. Despite not reaching this portion of the Engine Dual Failure checklist, the captain stated during postaccident interviews that he thought that he had obtained green dot speed immediately after the bird strike, maintained that speed until the airplane was configured for landing, and, after deploying the flaps, maintained a speed “safely above Vls,” which is the lowest selectable airspeed providing an appropriate margin to the stall speed. However, FDR data indicated that the airplane was below green dot speed and at Vls or slightly less for most of the descent, and about 15 to 19 knots below Vls during the last 200 feet. The NTSB concludes that the captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high AOAs, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage. (See additional discussion in section 2.7.1.) https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1003.pdf https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/...