7 ms·
The situation with keys is actually worse than Forbes makes out. Apparently they don't realize that (most) keys can now be copied from a photograph, from up to
by nl 14y ago
The situation with keys is actually worse than Forbes makes out.
Apparently they don't realize that (most) keys can now be copied from a photograph, from up to 195 feet away[1]. I realize that these "high security keys" are probably harder to duplicate than a normal key - but how many security officers know they should be keeping the keys out of sight as well as physically secure?
[1] http://hackaday.com/2009/09/22/photographic-key-duplication/ http://hackaday.com/2009/09/22/photographic-key-duplication/
- loceng 14y agoTime for fingerprint entry to become popular - at least until cloning specific body parts becomes a home-kit..
- unimpressive 14y agoYou could probably build a convincing fake-finger to fool the scanner.
- samstave 14y agoCloning of a specific body part has been a billion dollar industry for some time now...
- Simucal 14y agoMythbusters was able to defeat several fingerprint identification systems quite easily. At first their attempts were pretty elaborate. They lifted a fingerprint from a glass a person had held and then used an acidic solution to etch that pattern onto a mold. This mold then opened all of the high-end thumbprint readers they had. However, if I remember correctly, they then went low-tech and simply used a photocopy of the thumbprint which also opened several devices.
- sophacles 14y agoI think it is good to remember that security is situational. So unless a prisoner is holding a copy of every officer/guard/transfer agent's finger prints, they won't be able to undo the lock while in most detention situations (the only ones I can come up with are fairly contrived, or require the prisoner to escape in cuffs, making the point moot). Basically, if the arresting officer puts the cuffs on the detainee, and scans in his fingerprint as the "unlock with this fingerprint" option, it becomes very difficult for the detainee to get a copy of that print in a form that will work, and then use it, unlike an accessible hidden key known to work with $model-of-handcuff. Of course that says nothing about other ways to defeat the cuffs, which would probably become the prime area of research at that point. (why attack the locking mechanism if there are easier to defeat weaknesses).
- derrida 14y agoThe CCC are onto it https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVu5ofv92e0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVu5ofv92e0
- sbov 14y agoAccording to the article, that's not how handcuffs need to work. Handcuffs are designed so that one officer can put them on and another can take them off. If that weren't the case this situation of being able to print 1 key for all handcuffs wouldn't exist - they would simply make unique keys per handcuff.
- sophacles 14y agoFair enough, although, I think a procedure change and a "transfer authority" function could easily cover this. The transfer function would basically be: original cuffer presses the transfer button, swipes his print, the receiver then swipes his print, and the transfer is done. However, in a broader view, yeah, there are probably better ways than fingerprints handle keys once electronic locking mechanisms are introduced. Probably something akin to a 2-factor cryptographic mechanism.
- pavel_lishin 14y agoEasy nitpick, what if one of the officers gets sick, gets injured, or just plain forgets and goes home?
- sophacles 14y agoGood question. I don't know, but perhaps an override key. However now that the physical key isn't an open secret, and needed by everyone, they would be easier to secure. And small batches would have a specific key for that batch, but not for all cuffs, making it even harder for the detainee to have the right duplicate on hand. I feel though that my larger point is getting lost in this thread. It was/is: Just because a security technology doesn't work for reason $x in situation $y, that doesn't mean that the weaknesses also apply to situation $z.
- grassclip 14y agoDepending on the situation, I might be ok with fingerprint access (such as high secure areas and such). The problem is for normal everyday use, I wouldn't be able to tell where the data is going. Either the manufacturers themselves or governments or hackers could be storing the data about who enters which door and when which would be another attack on my personal privacy that I don't want to give up.
- zevyoura 14y agoThat's not really specific to fingerprint access though; I'm sure many companies track key card use.
- maxerickson 14y agoIf a house/building has windows or mostly wooden walls, the lock is really only preventing people from quietly using the door.
- loceng 14y agoIndeed. If someone truly wants in somewhere they will get in.
- sp332 14y agoMuch too late! http://www.h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/CCC-publishes-fingerprints-of-German-Home-Secretary-734713.html http://www.h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/CCC-publishes-f...
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- nl 14y agoGod no. Haven't we learnt by now? Two-Factor authentication (something you have + something you know) is for physical security as well as online.
- nrp 14y agoI actually found it easier to duplicate higher security keys than the usual household SC1 and KW1 ones. [0] What makes a lock difficult to print and difficult to pick can be very different. [0] http://eclecti.cc/hardware/physical-keygen-now-for-disc-detainer-locks http://eclecti.cc/hardware/physical-keygen-now-for-disc-deta...