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"All the pro-cloud talking points are just that - talking points that don't persuade anyone with any real technical understanding," This is false. AWS infrastr

"All the pro-cloud talking points are just that - talking points that don't persuade anyone with any real technical understanding," This is false. AWS infrastructure is vastly more secure than almost all company data centers. AWS has a rule that the same person cannot have logical access and physical access to the same storage device. Very few companies have enough IT people to have this rule. The AWS KMS is vastly more secure than what almost all companies are doing. The AWS network is vastly better designed and operated than almost all corporate networks. AWS S3 is more reliable and scalable than anything almost any company could create on their own. To create something even close to it you would need to implement something like MinIO using 3 separate data centers.

gooosle 2y ago
<citations needed>
j45 2y ago
The cloud is someone else’s computer. It’s like putting something in someone’s desk drawer under the guise of convenience at the expense of security. Why? Too often, someone other than the data owner has or can get access to the drawer directly or indirectly. Also, Cloud vs self hosted to me is a pendulum that has swung back and forth for a number of reasons. The benefits of the cloud outlined here are often a lot of open source tech packaged up and sold as manageable from a web browser, or a command line. One of the major reasons the cloud became popular was networking issues in Linux to manage volume at scale. At the time the cloud became very attractive for that reason, plus being able to virtualize bare metal servers to put into any combination of local to cloud hosting. Self-hosting has become easier by an order of magnitude or two for anyone who knew how to do it, except it’s something people who haven’t done both self-hosting and cloud can really discuss. Cloud has abstracted away the cost of horsepower, and converted it to transactions. People are discovering a fraction of the horsepower is needed to service their workloads than they thought. At some point the horsepower got way beyond what they needed and it wasn’t noticed. But paying for a cloud is convenient and standardized. Company data centres can be reasonably secured using a number of PaaS or IaaS solutions readily available off the shelf. Tools from VMware, Proxmox and others are tremendous. It may seem like there’s a lot to learn, except most problems they are new to someone have often been thought of a ton by both people with and without experience that is beyond cloud only.
- the_arun 2y ago
  > The cloud is someone else’s computer Isn’t it more like leasing in a public property? Meaning it is yours as long as you are paying the lease? Analogous to renting an apartment instead of owning a condo?
  - adamtulinius 2y ago
    Not at all. You can inspect the apartment you rent. The cloud is totally opaque in that regard.
    - j45 2y ago
      Totally opaque is a really nice way to describe it.
  - j45 2y ago
    Nope. It's literally putting private data in a shared drawer in someone else's desk where you have your area of the drawer.
    - jameshart 2y ago
      Literally? I would just like to point out that most of us who have ever had a job at an office, attended an academic institution, or lived in rented accommodation have kept stuff in someone else’s desk drawer from time to time. Often a leased desk in a building rented from a random landlord. Keeping things in someone else’s desk drawer can be convenient and offer a sufficient level of privacy for many purposes. And your proposed alternative to using ‘someone else’s desk drawer’ is, what, make your own desk? I guess, since I’m not a carpenter, I can buy a flatpack desk from ikea and assemble it and keep my stuff in that. I’m not sure that’s an improvement to my privacy posture in any meaningful sense though.
      - j45 2y ago
        It doesn’t have to be entirely literal, or not literal at all. A single point of managed/shared access to a drawer doesn’t fit all levels of data sensitivity and security. I understand this kind of wording and analogy might be triggering for the drive by down voters. A comment like the above though allows both people to openly consider viewpoints that may not be theirs. For me it shed light on something simpler. Shared access to shared infrastructure is not always secure as we want to tell ourselves. It’s important to be aware when it might be security through abstraction. The dual security and convenience of self-hosting IaaS and PaaS even at a dev, staging or small scale production has improved dramatically, and allows for things to be built in a cloud agnostic way to allow switching clouds to be much easier. It can also easily build a business case to lower cloud costs. Still, it doesn’t have to be for everyone either, where the cloud turns to be everything. A small example? For a stable homeland - their a couple of usff small servers running proxmox or something residential fibre behind a tailscale or cloudflare funnel and compare the cost for uptime. It’s surprising how much time servers and apps spend idling. Life and the real world is more than binary. Be it all cloud or no cloud.
fulafel 2y ago
OTOH: 1. big clouds are very lucrative targets for spooks, your data seem pretty likely to be hoovered up as "bycatch" (or maybe main catch depending on your luck) by various agencies and then traded around as currency 2. you never hear about security probems (incidents or exposure) in the platforms, there's no transparency 3. better than most coporate stuff is a low bar
- sfilmeyer 2y ago
  >3. better than most corporate stuff is a low bar I think it's a very relevant bar, though. The top level commenter made points about "a business of just about any size", which seems pretty exactly aligned with "most corporate stuff".
- likeabatterycar 2y ago
  > you never hear about security probems (incidents or exposure) in the platforms Except that one time... https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2023/04/how-a-former-amazon-web-services-employee-hacked-capital-one-paige-thompson-seattle https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2023/04/how-a-...
  - noprocrasted 2y ago
    If I remember right, the attacker’s AWS employment is irrelevant - no privileged AWS access was used in that case. The attacker working for AWS was a pure coincidence, it could’ve been anyone.
    - deleted 2y ago
      [deleted]
- stefan_ 2y ago
  4. we keep hitting hypervisor bugs and having to work around the fact that your software coexists on the same machine with 3rdparty untrusted software who might in fact be actively trying to attack you. All this silliness with encrypted memory buses and the various debilitating workarounds for silicon bugs. So yes, the cloud is very secure, except for the very thing that makes it the cloud that is not secure at all and has just been papered over because questioning it means the business model is bust.
noprocrasted 2y ago
> AWS infrastructure is vastly more secure than almost all company data centers Secure in what terms? Security is always about a threat model and trade-offs. There's no absolute, objective term of "security". > AWS has a rule that the same person cannot have logical access and physical access to the same storage device. Any promises they make aren't worth anything unless there's contractually-stipulated damages that AWS should pay in case of breach, those damages actually corresponding to the costs of said breach for the customer, and a history of actually paying out said damages without shenanigans. They've already got a track record of lying on their status pages, so it doesn't bode well. But I'm actually wondering what this specific rule even tries to defend against? You presumably care about data protection, so logical access is what matters. Physical access seems completely irrelevant no? > Very few companies have enough IT people to have this rule Maybe, but that doesn't actually mitigate anything from the company's perspective? The company itself would still be in the same position, aka not enough people to reliably separate responsibilities. Just that instead of those responsibilities being physical, they now happen inside the AWS console. > The AWS KMS is vastly more secure than what almost all companies are doing. See first point about security. Secure against what - what's the threat model you're trying to protect against by using KMS? But I'm not necessarily denying that (at least some) AWS services are very good. Question is, is that "goodness" required for your use-case, is it enough to overcome its associated downsides, and is the overall cost worth it? A pragmatic approach would be to evaluate every component on its merits and fitness to the problem at hand instead of going all in, one way or another.
- cyberax 2y ago
  > They've already got a track record of lying on their status pages, so it doesn't bode well. ???
- nine_k 2y ago
  Physical access is pretty relevant if you could bribe an engineer to locate some valuable data's physical location, then go service the particular machine, copy the disk (during servicing "degraded hardware"), and thus exflitrate the data without any traces of a breach.
- Brian_K_White 2y ago
Aachen 2y ago
AWS is so complicated, we usually find more impactful permission problems than in any company using their own hardware
rmbyrro 2y ago
about security, most businesses using AWS invest little to nothing in securing their software, or even adopt basic security practices for their employees having the most secure data center doesn't matter if you load your secrets as env vars in a system that can be easily compromised by a motivated attacker so i don't buy this argument as a general reason pro-cloud
- dajonker 2y ago
  This exactly, most leaks don't involve any physical access. Why bother with something hard when you can just get in through an unmaintained Wordpress/SharePoint/other legacy product that some department can't live without.
evantbyrne 2y ago
Making API calls from a VM on shared hardware to KMS is vastly more secure than doing AES locally? I'm skeptical to say the least.
- UltraSane 2y ago
  Encrypting data is easy, securely managing keys is the hard part. KMS is the Key Management Service. And AWS put a lot of thought and work into it. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details/intro.html https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details...
  - evantbyrne 2y ago
    KMS access is granted by either environment variables or by authorizing the instance itself. Either way, if the instance is compromised, then so is access to KMS. So unless your threat model involves preventing the government from looking at your data through some theoretical sophisticated physical attack, then your primary concerns are likely the same as running a box in another physically secure location. So the same rules of needing to design your encryption scheme to minimize blowout from a complete hostile takeover still apply.
    - Xylakant 2y ago
      An attacker gaining temporary capability to encrypt/decrypt data through a compromised instance is painful. An attacker gaining a copy of a private key is still an entirely different world of pain.
      - evantbyrne 2y ago
        Painful is an understatement. Keys for sensitive customer data should be derived from customer secrets either way. Almost nobody does that though, because it requires actual forethought. Instead they just slap secrets in KMS and pretend it's better than encrypted environment variables or other secrets services. If an attacker can read your secrets with the same level of penetration into your system, then it's all the same security wise.
gauravphoenix 2y ago
one of my greatest learnings in life is to differentiate between facts and opinions- sometimes opinions are presented as facts and vice-versa. if you think about it- the statement "this is false" is a response to an opinion (presented as a fact) but not a fact. there is no way one can objectively define and defend what does "real technical understanding" means. the cloud space is vast with millions of people having varied understanding and thus opinions. so let's not fight the battle that will never be won. there is no point in convincing pro-cloud people that cloud isn't the right choice and vice-versa. let people share stories where it made sense and where it didn't. as someone who has lived in cloud security space since 2009 (and was founder of redlock - one of the first CSPMs), in my opinion, there is no doubt that AWS is indeed superiorly designed than most corp. networks- but is that you really need? if you run entire corp and LOB apps on aws but have poor security practices, will it be right decision? what if you have the best security engineers in the world but they are best at Cisco type of security - configuring VLANS and managing endpoints but are not good at detecting someone using IMDSv1 in ec2 exposed to the internet and running a vulnerable (to csrf) app? when the scope of discussion is as vast as cloud vs on-prem, imo, it is a bad idea to make absolute statements.
- fulafel 2y ago
  Great points. Also if you end up building your apps as rube goldberg machines living up to "AWS Well Architected" criteria (indoctrinated by staff lots of AWS certifications, leading to a lot of AWS certified staff whose paycheck now depends on following AWS recommended practices) the complexity will kill your security, as nobody will understand the systems anymore.
dehrmann 2y ago
The other part is that when us-east-1 goes down, you can blame AWS, and a third of your customer's vendors will be doing the same. When you unplug the power to your colo rack while installing a new server, that's on you.
- throwawaysxcd0 2y ago
  OTOH, when your company's web site is down you can do something about it. When the CEO asks about it, you can explain why its offline and more importantly what is being done to bring it back. The equivalent situation for those who took a cloud based approach is often... ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
  - szundi 2y ago
    Hey boss, I go to sleep now, site should be up anytime. Cheers
  - Xylakant 2y ago
    The more relevant question is whether my efforts to do something lead to a better and faster result than my cloud providers efforts to do something. I get it - it feels powerless to do nothing, but for a lot of organizations I’ve seen the average downtime would still be higher.
    - UltraSane 2y ago
      I worked in IT for a state government and they had a partial outage of their Exchange server that lasted over 2 weeks. It triggered a full migration to Exchange online.
  - lukevp 2y ago
    With the cloud, in a lot of cases you can have additional regions that incur very little cost as they scale dynamically with traffic. It’s hard to do that with on-prem. Also many AWS services come cross-AZ (AZ is a data center), so their arch is more robust than a single Colo server even if you’re in a single region.
wslh 2y ago
From a critical perspective, your comment made me think about the risks posed by rogue IT personnel, especially at scale in the cloud. For example, Fastmail is a single point of failure as a DoS target, whereas attacking an entire datacenter can impact multiple clients simultaneously. It all comes down to understanding the attack vectors.
- UltraSane 2y ago
  Cloud providers are very big targets but have enormous economic incentive to be secure and thus have very large teams of very competent security experts.
  - wslh 2y ago
    You can have full security competence but be a rogue actor at the same time.
    - portaouflop 2y ago
      You can also have rogue actors in your company, you don’t need 3rd parties for that
      - wslh 2y ago
        That doesn't sum up my comments in the thread. A rogue actor in a datacenter could attack zillions of companies at the same time while rogue actors in a single company only once.
        UltraSane 2y ago
        And I bet AWS is also better at detecting rogue actors.
      - UltraSane 2y ago
        And I bet AWS is better at detecting them.
likeabatterycar 2y ago
AWS hires the same cretins that inhabit every other IT department, they just usually happen to be more technically capable. That doesn't make them any more or less trustworthy or reliable.
- UltraSane 2y ago
  "cretins"?
psychoslave 2y ago
Taking for granted all these points. How many businesses out there actually need this kind of security/scalability, compared to how many use cloud services and pay extra cost for something they don't need?

gooosle 2y ago

j45 2y ago

The cloud is someone else’s computer. It’s like putting something in someone’s desk drawer under the guise of convenience at the expense of security. Why? Too often, someone other than the data owner has or can get access to the drawer directly or indirectly. Also, Cloud vs self hosted to me is a pendulum that has swung back and forth for a number of reasons. The benefits of the cloud outlined here are often a lot of open source tech packaged up and sold as manageable from a web browser, or a command line. One of the major reasons the cloud became popular was networking issues in Linux to manage volume at scale. At the time the cloud became very attractive for that reason, plus being able to virtualize bare metal servers to put into any combination of local to cloud hosting. Self-hosting has become easier by an order of magnitude or two for anyone who knew how to do it, except it’s something people who haven’t done both self-hosting and cloud can really discuss. Cloud has abstracted away the cost of horsepower, and converted it to transactions. People are discovering a fraction of the horsepower is needed to service their workloads than they thought. At some point the horsepower got way beyond what they needed and it wasn’t noticed. But paying for a cloud is convenient and standardized. Company data centres can be reasonably secured using a number of PaaS or IaaS solutions readily available off the shelf. Tools from VMware, Proxmox and others are tremendous. It may seem like there’s a lot to learn, except most problems they are new to someone have often been thought of a ton by both people with and without experience that is beyond cloud only.

the_arun 2y ago
> The cloud is someone else’s computer Isn’t it more like leasing in a public property? Meaning it is yours as long as you are paying the lease? Analogous to renting an apartment instead of owning a condo?
- adamtulinius 2y ago
  Not at all. You can inspect the apartment you rent. The cloud is totally opaque in that regard.
  - j45 2y ago
    Totally opaque is a really nice way to describe it.
- j45 2y ago
  Nope. It's literally putting private data in a shared drawer in someone else's desk where you have your area of the drawer.
  - jameshart 2y ago
    Literally? I would just like to point out that most of us who have ever had a job at an office, attended an academic institution, or lived in rented accommodation have kept stuff in someone else’s desk drawer from time to time. Often a leased desk in a building rented from a random landlord. Keeping things in someone else’s desk drawer can be convenient and offer a sufficient level of privacy for many purposes. And your proposed alternative to using ‘someone else’s desk drawer’ is, what, make your own desk? I guess, since I’m not a carpenter, I can buy a flatpack desk from ikea and assemble it and keep my stuff in that. I’m not sure that’s an improvement to my privacy posture in any meaningful sense though.
    - j45 2y ago
      It doesn’t have to be entirely literal, or not literal at all. A single point of managed/shared access to a drawer doesn’t fit all levels of data sensitivity and security. I understand this kind of wording and analogy might be triggering for the drive by down voters. A comment like the above though allows both people to openly consider viewpoints that may not be theirs. For me it shed light on something simpler. Shared access to shared infrastructure is not always secure as we want to tell ourselves. It’s important to be aware when it might be security through abstraction. The dual security and convenience of self-hosting IaaS and PaaS even at a dev, staging or small scale production has improved dramatically, and allows for things to be built in a cloud agnostic way to allow switching clouds to be much easier. It can also easily build a business case to lower cloud costs. Still, it doesn’t have to be for everyone either, where the cloud turns to be everything. A small example? For a stable homeland - their a couple of usff small servers running proxmox or something residential fibre behind a tailscale or cloudflare funnel and compare the cost for uptime. It’s surprising how much time servers and apps spend idling. Life and the real world is more than binary. Be it all cloud or no cloud.

fulafel 2y ago

OTOH: 1. big clouds are very lucrative targets for spooks, your data seem pretty likely to be hoovered up as "bycatch" (or maybe main catch depending on your luck) by various agencies and then traded around as currency 2. you never hear about security probems (incidents or exposure) in the platforms, there's no transparency 3. better than most coporate stuff is a low bar

sfilmeyer 2y ago
>3. better than most corporate stuff is a low bar I think it's a very relevant bar, though. The top level commenter made points about "a business of just about any size", which seems pretty exactly aligned with "most corporate stuff".
likeabatterycar 2y ago
> you never hear about security probems (incidents or exposure) in the platforms Except that one time... https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2023/04/how-a-former-amazon-web-services-employee-hacked-capital-one-paige-thompson-seattle https://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-city-life/2023/04/how-a-...
- noprocrasted 2y ago
  If I remember right, the attacker’s AWS employment is irrelevant - no privileged AWS access was used in that case. The attacker working for AWS was a pure coincidence, it could’ve been anyone.
  - deleted 2y ago
    [deleted]
stefan_ 2y ago
4. we keep hitting hypervisor bugs and having to work around the fact that your software coexists on the same machine with 3rdparty untrusted software who might in fact be actively trying to attack you. All this silliness with encrypted memory buses and the various debilitating workarounds for silicon bugs. So yes, the cloud is very secure, except for the very thing that makes it the cloud that is not secure at all and has just been papered over because questioning it means the business model is bust.

noprocrasted 2y ago

> AWS infrastructure is vastly more secure than almost all company data centers Secure in what terms? Security is always about a threat model and trade-offs. There's no absolute, objective term of "security". > AWS has a rule that the same person cannot have logical access and physical access to the same storage device. Any promises they make aren't worth anything unless there's contractually-stipulated damages that AWS should pay in case of breach, those damages actually corresponding to the costs of said breach for the customer, and a history of actually paying out said damages without shenanigans. They've already got a track record of lying on their status pages, so it doesn't bode well. But I'm actually wondering what this specific rule even tries to defend against? You presumably care about data protection, so logical access is what matters. Physical access seems completely irrelevant no? > Very few companies have enough IT people to have this rule Maybe, but that doesn't actually mitigate anything from the company's perspective? The company itself would still be in the same position, aka not enough people to reliably separate responsibilities. Just that instead of those responsibilities being physical, they now happen inside the AWS console. > The AWS KMS is vastly more secure than what almost all companies are doing. See first point about security. Secure against what - what's the threat model you're trying to protect against by using KMS? But I'm not necessarily denying that (at least some) AWS services are very good. Question is, is that "goodness" required for your use-case, is it enough to overcome its associated downsides, and is the overall cost worth it? A pragmatic approach would be to evaluate every component on its merits and fitness to the problem at hand instead of going all in, one way or another.

cyberax 2y ago
> They've already got a track record of lying on their status pages, so it doesn't bode well. ???
nine_k 2y ago
Physical access is pretty relevant if you could bribe an engineer to locate some valuable data's physical location, then go service the particular machine, copy the disk (during servicing "degraded hardware"), and thus exflitrate the data without any traces of a breach.
Brian_K_White 2y ago

Aachen 2y ago

AWS is so complicated, we usually find more impactful permission problems than in any company using their own hardware

rmbyrro 2y ago

about security, most businesses using AWS invest little to nothing in securing their software, or even adopt basic security practices for their employees having the most secure data center doesn't matter if you load your secrets as env vars in a system that can be easily compromised by a motivated attacker so i don't buy this argument as a general reason pro-cloud

dajonker 2y ago
This exactly, most leaks don't involve any physical access. Why bother with something hard when you can just get in through an unmaintained Wordpress/SharePoint/other legacy product that some department can't live without.

evantbyrne 2y ago

Making API calls from a VM on shared hardware to KMS is vastly more secure than doing AES locally? I'm skeptical to say the least.

UltraSane 2y ago
Encrypting data is easy, securely managing keys is the hard part. KMS is the Key Management Service. And AWS put a lot of thought and work into it. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details/intro.html https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details...
- evantbyrne 2y ago
  KMS access is granted by either environment variables or by authorizing the instance itself. Either way, if the instance is compromised, then so is access to KMS. So unless your threat model involves preventing the government from looking at your data through some theoretical sophisticated physical attack, then your primary concerns are likely the same as running a box in another physically secure location. So the same rules of needing to design your encryption scheme to minimize blowout from a complete hostile takeover still apply.
  - Xylakant 2y ago
    An attacker gaining temporary capability to encrypt/decrypt data through a compromised instance is painful. An attacker gaining a copy of a private key is still an entirely different world of pain.
    - evantbyrne 2y ago
      Painful is an understatement. Keys for sensitive customer data should be derived from customer secrets either way. Almost nobody does that though, because it requires actual forethought. Instead they just slap secrets in KMS and pretend it's better than encrypted environment variables or other secrets services. If an attacker can read your secrets with the same level of penetration into your system, then it's all the same security wise.

gauravphoenix 2y ago

one of my greatest learnings in life is to differentiate between facts and opinions- sometimes opinions are presented as facts and vice-versa. if you think about it- the statement "this is false" is a response to an opinion (presented as a fact) but not a fact. there is no way one can objectively define and defend what does "real technical understanding" means. the cloud space is vast with millions of people having varied understanding and thus opinions. so let's not fight the battle that will never be won. there is no point in convincing pro-cloud people that cloud isn't the right choice and vice-versa. let people share stories where it made sense and where it didn't. as someone who has lived in cloud security space since 2009 (and was founder of redlock - one of the first CSPMs), in my opinion, there is no doubt that AWS is indeed superiorly designed than most corp. networks- but is that you really need? if you run entire corp and LOB apps on aws but have poor security practices, will it be right decision? what if you have the best security engineers in the world but they are best at Cisco type of security - configuring VLANS and managing endpoints but are not good at detecting someone using IMDSv1 in ec2 exposed to the internet and running a vulnerable (to csrf) app? when the scope of discussion is as vast as cloud vs on-prem, imo, it is a bad idea to make absolute statements.

fulafel 2y ago
Great points. Also if you end up building your apps as rube goldberg machines living up to "AWS Well Architected" criteria (indoctrinated by staff lots of AWS certifications, leading to a lot of AWS certified staff whose paycheck now depends on following AWS recommended practices) the complexity will kill your security, as nobody will understand the systems anymore.

dehrmann 2y ago

The other part is that when us-east-1 goes down, you can blame AWS, and a third of your customer's vendors will be doing the same. When you unplug the power to your colo rack while installing a new server, that's on you.

throwawaysxcd0 2y ago
OTOH, when your company's web site is down you can do something about it. When the CEO asks about it, you can explain why its offline and more importantly what is being done to bring it back. The equivalent situation for those who took a cloud based approach is often... ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
- szundi 2y ago
  Hey boss, I go to sleep now, site should be up anytime. Cheers
- Xylakant 2y ago
  The more relevant question is whether my efforts to do something lead to a better and faster result than my cloud providers efforts to do something. I get it - it feels powerless to do nothing, but for a lot of organizations I’ve seen the average downtime would still be higher.
  - UltraSane 2y ago
    I worked in IT for a state government and they had a partial outage of their Exchange server that lasted over 2 weeks. It triggered a full migration to Exchange online.
- lukevp 2y ago
  With the cloud, in a lot of cases you can have additional regions that incur very little cost as they scale dynamically with traffic. It’s hard to do that with on-prem. Also many AWS services come cross-AZ (AZ is a data center), so their arch is more robust than a single Colo server even if you’re in a single region.

wslh 2y ago

From a critical perspective, your comment made me think about the risks posed by rogue IT personnel, especially at scale in the cloud. For example, Fastmail is a single point of failure as a DoS target, whereas attacking an entire datacenter can impact multiple clients simultaneously. It all comes down to understanding the attack vectors.

UltraSane 2y ago
Cloud providers are very big targets but have enormous economic incentive to be secure and thus have very large teams of very competent security experts.
- wslh 2y ago
  You can have full security competence but be a rogue actor at the same time.
  - portaouflop 2y ago
    You can also have rogue actors in your company, you don’t need 3rd parties for that
    - wslh 2y ago
      That doesn't sum up my comments in the thread. A rogue actor in a datacenter could attack zillions of companies at the same time while rogue actors in a single company only once.
      - UltraSane 2y ago
        And I bet AWS is also better at detecting rogue actors.
    - UltraSane 2y ago
      And I bet AWS is better at detecting them.

likeabatterycar 2y ago

AWS hires the same cretins that inhabit every other IT department, they just usually happen to be more technically capable. That doesn't make them any more or less trustworthy or reliable.

UltraSane 2y ago
"cretins"?

psychoslave 2y ago

Taking for granted all these points. How many businesses out there actually need this kind of security/scalability, compared to how many use cloud services and pay extra cost for something they don't need?