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This argument has been addressed quite a bit by "AI safety" types. See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI_capability_control https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI
by zahlman 2y ago
This argument has been addressed quite a bit by "AI safety" types. See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI_capability_control https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI_capability_control ; related: https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1450:_AI-Box_Experiment https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1450:_AI-Bo... . The short version: people concerned about this sort of thing often also believe that an AI system (not necessarily just an LLM) could reach the point where, inevitably, the output from a run of this function would convince an engineer to break the "restricted interface". At a sufficient level of sophistication, it would only have to happen once. (If you say "just make sure nobody reads the output" - at that point, having the function is useless.)
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- qsort 2y agoI technically left myself some wiggle room, but to face the argument head on: that is begging the question more than a little bit. A "sufficiently advanced" system can be assumed to have any capability. Why? Because it's "sufficiently advanced". How would it get those capabilities? Just have a "sufficiently advanced" system build it. lol. lmao, even.