5 ms·

Remember what I said: The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutat

Remember what I said: The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. I mentioned a while back that you cannot justify your conclusion by being aloof (or vague, for that matter) about the argument for it. Note that this nominal counter-argument does not render irrelevant the question of what you mean by 'likeness', and whether it differs from the sort of correspondence that information flow along causal chains can bring about. In fact, if you do not say anything definite, I can simply assert, as a premise, that they are the same thing, and rephrase this nominal counter-argument accordingly.

geye1234 2y ago
> Far from adding any specificity to what you mean by likeness, your Dec. 12 post [1] continues to avoid doing so. Very good. My "theory", if you must call it that, is Aristotelian moderate realism. A full discussion of what I mean by "likeness" would necessarily invoke concepts from that worldview. So it would therefore involve debating the truth/falsehood of said worldview. I don't want to do that for two reasons: first because it'd take the scope of the discussion far beyond whether thought can be material or not, and time is a big constraining factor. And secondly, we'd just be re-inventing the wheel. You'll find moderate realism ably defended by several authors who I can recommend if you're interested, and no doubt you'll know of your own list of attempted debunkings. But as a compromise, I can propose the following partial definition: Two objects are alike if they are the same in some respect. So an apple and a banana are the same in that they are both fruit (and this works even if categorizations of this sort are merely conventional), but different in that one is red and the other yellow. More formally, we could say that A and B are alike if we can predicate X of both A and B. As a corollary, A and B are entirely un-alike if we cannot predicate anything of both A and B. If you're good to go with that we can proceed. It would then be necessary to ask (1) Whether a thought must be like its object (using the definition just given) in order for it to be about its object; (2) If so, in what manner it must be like its object; (3) Whether said manner can be material. I don't think "the same" can be usefully (verbally) defined, since there is a point at which verbal definitions involve defining words whose meaning is more-clear in terms of those whose meaning is less-clear. > The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. It is possible I misunderstand you, but it doesn't appear to present me with a challenge. Premise 6 is false in any interpretation that could be given it. That is not question-begging, nor is it burden-shifting, and whether this response applies to any aspects of my own argument is precisely what we're debating. Points 1 thru 5 are unobjectionable, assuming some unusual meaning has not been assigned to any of the terms. Is your point that I'm stating the opposite of premise 6 in my argument without justification?
- mannykannot 2y ago
  The latest reason for not saying what you mean by likeness is that you don't want to do what it would take. While I can understand your reluctance to go there, it does not make the problems created by the absence of any specifics about this likeness go away. You say that doing so would take the scope of the discussion far beyond whether thought can be material or not. This is surprising: this likeness, and claims about what follows from it, are key premises to your argument, and so, surely, establishing what this likeness is and how it leads to your conclusion is central to addressing the question of whether thought can be material or not has been answered by your thesis? Your assertion that this would be re-inventing the wheel does not seem to fit with your concern about the scope of the ensuing discussion, either - if it's all been worked out already,how come it hasn't been written up already in, say, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, all packaged up and demanding little more of your time than some commentary (it is also implausible that if this wheel has already been invented, philosophers would still be about equally divided over the question - and yet they are.) As it stands, your claim that the answer is already out there is yet another one made without justification, and any suggestion that skeptics of your bold claim should figure this out for themselves would amount to another form of burden shifting. Examining your compromise, "two objects are alike if they are the same in some respect" seems to me to be a good definition of 'alike' (better than those in the couple of dictionaries I looked at, IMHO) and likewise, I have little to say about "more formally, we could say that A and B are alike if we can predicate X of both A and B. As a corollary, A and B are entirely un-alike if we cannot predicate anything of both A and B", except that we need some sort of restriction on appropriate predicates (I don't think it would be helpful to say that a horse is like a dogma on account of their English-language names both having five letters.) With regard to your three questions: there's nothing wrong with 1, though the definition of 'like;' that you have just given is so broad as to give little or any guidance; 2 is both the one I think might be answered by information flow via CHOC and the one you have resolutely avoided addressing (you still have not even said whether or not my CHOC-mediated 'correspondence' is your 'likeness'), and at 3, we can equally ask whether said manner can be immaterial. You go on to say that you don't think "the same" can be usefully (verbally) defined,which I find surprising, as philosophers seem to use the word 'identical' with great abandon - is that not more or less the same? I might get your point if you said which more-clear and less-clear words you are thinking of here. After this you seem to abruptly switch topic, leaving me puzzled as to what you are driving at in the six paragraphs beginning "But, as a compromise..." Is there something missing? It feels as if there is. The point of the alternative argument is not so much that you are stating the opposite of premise 6 (arguably what you have said, in various ways, is not quite the opposite), but that both of them depend on leaps of faith for which no justification has been given. One other thing I am still curious about is whether your likeness is intrinsic to thoughts (I gave my reasons for doubting it could be in my first Dec. 14 post, beginning "We can continue with this line of thought...")

geye1234 2y ago

> Far from adding any specificity to what you mean by likeness, your Dec. 12 post [1] continues to avoid doing so. Very good. My "theory", if you must call it that, is Aristotelian moderate realism. A full discussion of what I mean by "likeness" would necessarily invoke concepts from that worldview. So it would therefore involve debating the truth/falsehood of said worldview. I don't want to do that for two reasons: first because it'd take the scope of the discussion far beyond whether thought can be material or not, and time is a big constraining factor. And secondly, we'd just be re-inventing the wheel. You'll find moderate realism ably defended by several authors who I can recommend if you're interested, and no doubt you'll know of your own list of attempted debunkings. But as a compromise, I can propose the following partial definition: Two objects are alike if they are the same in some respect. So an apple and a banana are the same in that they are both fruit (and this works even if categorizations of this sort are merely conventional), but different in that one is red and the other yellow. More formally, we could say that A and B are alike if we can predicate X of both A and B. As a corollary, A and B are entirely un-alike if we cannot predicate anything of both A and B. If you're good to go with that we can proceed. It would then be necessary to ask (1) Whether a thought must be like its object (using the definition just given) in order for it to be about its object; (2) If so, in what manner it must be like its object; (3) Whether said manner can be material. I don't think "the same" can be usefully (verbally) defined, since there is a point at which verbal definitions involve defining words whose meaning is more-clear in terms of those whose meaning is less-clear. > The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. It is possible I misunderstand you, but it doesn't appear to present me with a challenge. Premise 6 is false in any interpretation that could be given it. That is not question-begging, nor is it burden-shifting, and whether this response applies to any aspects of my own argument is precisely what we're debating. Points 1 thru 5 are unobjectionable, assuming some unusual meaning has not been assigned to any of the terms. Is your point that I'm stating the opposite of premise 6 in my argument without justification?

mannykannot 2y ago
The latest reason for not saying what you mean by likeness is that you don't want to do what it would take. While I can understand your reluctance to go there, it does not make the problems created by the absence of any specifics about this likeness go away. You say that doing so would take the scope of the discussion far beyond whether thought can be material or not. This is surprising: this likeness, and claims about what follows from it, are key premises to your argument, and so, surely, establishing what this likeness is and how it leads to your conclusion is central to addressing the question of whether thought can be material or not has been answered by your thesis? Your assertion that this would be re-inventing the wheel does not seem to fit with your concern about the scope of the ensuing discussion, either - if it's all been worked out already,how come it hasn't been written up already in, say, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, all packaged up and demanding little more of your time than some commentary (it is also implausible that if this wheel has already been invented, philosophers would still be about equally divided over the question - and yet they are.) As it stands, your claim that the answer is already out there is yet another one made without justification, and any suggestion that skeptics of your bold claim should figure this out for themselves would amount to another form of burden shifting. Examining your compromise, "two objects are alike if they are the same in some respect" seems to me to be a good definition of 'alike' (better than those in the couple of dictionaries I looked at, IMHO) and likewise, I have little to say about "more formally, we could say that A and B are alike if we can predicate X of both A and B. As a corollary, A and B are entirely un-alike if we cannot predicate anything of both A and B", except that we need some sort of restriction on appropriate predicates (I don't think it would be helpful to say that a horse is like a dogma on account of their English-language names both having five letters.) With regard to your three questions: there's nothing wrong with 1, though the definition of 'like;' that you have just given is so broad as to give little or any guidance; 2 is both the one I think might be answered by information flow via CHOC and the one you have resolutely avoided addressing (you still have not even said whether or not my CHOC-mediated 'correspondence' is your 'likeness'), and at 3, we can equally ask whether said manner can be immaterial. You go on to say that you don't think "the same" can be usefully (verbally) defined,which I find surprising, as philosophers seem to use the word 'identical' with great abandon - is that not more or less the same? I might get your point if you said which more-clear and less-clear words you are thinking of here. After this you seem to abruptly switch topic, leaving me puzzled as to what you are driving at in the six paragraphs beginning "But, as a compromise..." Is there something missing? It feels as if there is. The point of the alternative argument is not so much that you are stating the opposite of premise 6 (arguably what you have said, in various ways, is not quite the opposite), but that both of them depend on leaps of faith for which no justification has been given. One other thing I am still curious about is whether your likeness is intrinsic to thoughts (I gave my reasons for doubting it could be in my first Dec. 14 post, beginning "We can continue with this line of thought...")