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Thanks for this reply! You’re right to call out just how enormously expensive nuke boats are. Anything carrying around a nuclear powerplant for that matter. Th

Thanks for this reply! You’re right to call out just how enormously expensive nuke boats are. Anything carrying around a nuclear powerplant for that matter. They are the modern day battleships (Just see how the US Navy names theirs). For AUKUS, I tried to keep my argument to the warfighting value of the boats separate from the economics. But there’s a whole line of argument there you call out, which I think finalizes with the question “Can Australia afford to build forces necessary to participate in a Pacific conflict away from its shores?” Not off the Australian coast, but north of Indonesia where they envision defending Taiwan, protecting the Malacca strait, etc. I don’t think that’s an easy question to answer. I don’t think their previous plan of getting new AIP boats was a good one if that was their aim. But it’s fair to question if they can afford nuke boats either. I disagree that rocket forces can be a stand-in for submarines. They’re great defense weapons: certainly for shore defense, questionable for longer distances that that (I’m making an obligatory nod to China’s ballistic anti-ship efforts), and of course, air-launched AShMs were a primary threat during the Cold War. But these all lack persistence, and require a lot of effort to target the thing on the other end; something made much more difficult the further away it is. And that’s the thing a submarine VLS cell gives you that an air-launched or shore launched missile doesn’t; It’s right there. I don’t think the subsonic speed is much of an issue when it pops up 10km from your task force. It’s the persistence, the endurance, that gives submarines (and surface ships for that matter) their role that land and air based missiles can’t. The latter can make things painful, but they can’t truly control a body of water for duration in the way those platforms can. But you’re right to point out that China’s math is likely different than that of say, the U.S., because the latter has to come across the Pacific to do so. Force projection is expensive, and this is the challenge facing Australia. The U.S. can afford to do it (though I think it’s slipping in this regard), other major militaries such as the U.K. are facing hard questions about just how global they want to be. Australia is far enough away that if they want to help in those aforementioned scenarios, they need to bring the fight north, and that’s an expensive prospect for a country of just 24 million. The last thing I’ll mention is while I think your points about the challenges of operating in the South and East China Sea would be very difficult in the face of enemy ASW, those submarines would not be operating alone. They operate as part of a whole (land, sea, air). It's not the pacific submarine campaigns of WWII and lone wolves hitting shipping. Though if it turns into that, we’re in real trouble.

kjkjadksj 2y ago
I’m just a lay person in this, but aren’t we in an era where you can image anything on the surface of the earth and hit it with a missile? Seems like if you are going to use a sub to find a ship to shoot it with a torpedo, you might as well use a satellite to find a ship and have something hit the ship from orbit and not have to send out a sub with 200 people on it to do so. Could do it all from a bunker on shore. Or maybe I misunderstand how easy it is to fire arbitrary missiles or scan the sea with satellites.
maxglute 2y ago
Value of ships/projection platforms is how it mediates geography and technology and economy. Pacific/Atlantic ocean offering US 10,000km+ buffer on each side means historically, US HAS to rely on mobile platforms (and forward basing) to hull sufficient munitions in theatre across the pond due to both technologic and economic limitations, i.e. there technologically was no accurate long range fire, no sufficient ISR (pre space / gps) that would enable medium / long range strikes, and economically to deliver accurate munitions at scale, shooters needed to be close / right there. But being "right there" is a consequence, of HAVING to be right there. Cruise missiles extended "right there" to standoff ranges of 1000-2000km, but we're also in age of meter level CEP 5000km IRBMs/AShMs, shooters don't have to be "right there" anymore. IMO important not to conflate with being able to shoot something, for needing to be "right there" to shoot something. If anything you want to be no where near where the shooting happens. Words like "persistence", "presence", "projection" gets abused as proxy for (sea) control, especially useful propaganda/signalling tool during peacetime (look, we're right there), but the actual coercive power during peacetime or control during shooting war is done by the munitions (and sensors to direct them). Modern day rocketry + persistent space ISR can like cover what historically needed carriers/subs to cover, especially for AU considerations (IRBM range) hence value proposition of SSGNs is different, which is why I question the AUKUS sales pitch from warfighting capability perspective. Land based rocketry also much more flexible than committing to SSGNs + cheaper shorter range cruise missiles ... that requires subs to operate closer to their target, using likely interceptable / defeatable munitions (since the subsurface gamble is stealth lets you shiv with ~100 smaller cruise missiles up close vs ~20 hypersonics from far away), but if munitions doesn't measure up, might as well not be in theatre in the first place, and chance of retrofitting subs around larger extended range munitions unlikely, so it's multi decade gamble. This is not to mention the complexity of subsurface kill chain / communicating underwater. Meanwhile a PLARF TEL popping out of a tunnel in Hainan to launch a mach10 missile can reach Darwin in 20 minutes. AKA no defense/offense dichotomy, rocketforce can also do anti area/access denial, i.e. when targetting Guam, forward bases in 1IC. 360B buys a lot of irbms, i.e. everything up to 1-2IC/Australia north coast might as well as be "right there" from PRC theatre/IRBM perspective. Recipriocally AU can also do this from upside down land. Is AU better served with risking forward positioned SSGN with 100 x 2000 km cruise missile sized cells or for same price, 400 x 5000km land based hypersonics that can cover the theatre, plus distributed for more survivablity. IMO Australia has options other than SSGN to bring the fight north 5000km versus US trying to bring the fight west 10000km. Especially considering the maritime choke points across 1IC. Question is: which options better for AU to spend 360B to have some sort of medium / long range fires into SCS / IndoPac theatre. Considering SSGNs will lock in procurement for 50+ years. Especially considering hulls won't be in water in meaningful numbers for 20+ years while PRC ASW capablities are growing. Meanwhile, PLA is also coordinating land, sea, air at likely greater relative scale than what US+co are projected to bring in theatre, which increases challenges of subsurface survivability with time. IMO all the trendlines are against locking in on eggs in basket of expensive subsurface. It's gamble on purely warfighting value, which cannot be seperated from procurement economics, as in opportunity cost of what other warfighting capabilities that 360B can buy, and sustainment economics, as in SSGNs are such big investments that it will constrain future procurement options. Decommissioning nuclear will make even divestment hard. My feeling is AU better off with some IAPs for near shore defense, and missiles / B21s for long range fires / cheaper per unit procurements that enables future pivot. But as expensive as AUKUS is, on paper it has more domestic $$$ potential, but strategically bad gamble.

kjkjadksj 2y ago

I’m just a lay person in this, but aren’t we in an era where you can image anything on the surface of the earth and hit it with a missile? Seems like if you are going to use a sub to find a ship to shoot it with a torpedo, you might as well use a satellite to find a ship and have something hit the ship from orbit and not have to send out a sub with 200 people on it to do so. Could do it all from a bunker on shore. Or maybe I misunderstand how easy it is to fire arbitrary missiles or scan the sea with satellites.

maxglute 2y ago

Value of ships/projection platforms is how it mediates geography and technology and economy. Pacific/Atlantic ocean offering US 10,000km+ buffer on each side means historically, US HAS to rely on mobile platforms (and forward basing) to hull sufficient munitions in theatre across the pond due to both technologic and economic limitations, i.e. there technologically was no accurate long range fire, no sufficient ISR (pre space / gps) that would enable medium / long range strikes, and economically to deliver accurate munitions at scale, shooters needed to be close / right there. But being "right there" is a consequence, of HAVING to be right there. Cruise missiles extended "right there" to standoff ranges of 1000-2000km, but we're also in age of meter level CEP 5000km IRBMs/AShMs, shooters don't have to be "right there" anymore. IMO important not to conflate with being able to shoot something, for needing to be "right there" to shoot something. If anything you want to be no where near where the shooting happens. Words like "persistence", "presence", "projection" gets abused as proxy for (sea) control, especially useful propaganda/signalling tool during peacetime (look, we're right there), but the actual coercive power during peacetime or control during shooting war is done by the munitions (and sensors to direct them). Modern day rocketry + persistent space ISR can like cover what historically needed carriers/subs to cover, especially for AU considerations (IRBM range) hence value proposition of SSGNs is different, which is why I question the AUKUS sales pitch from warfighting capability perspective. Land based rocketry also much more flexible than committing to SSGNs + cheaper shorter range cruise missiles ... that requires subs to operate closer to their target, using likely interceptable / defeatable munitions (since the subsurface gamble is stealth lets you shiv with ~100 smaller cruise missiles up close vs ~20 hypersonics from far away), but if munitions doesn't measure up, might as well not be in theatre in the first place, and chance of retrofitting subs around larger extended range munitions unlikely, so it's multi decade gamble. This is not to mention the complexity of subsurface kill chain / communicating underwater. Meanwhile a PLARF TEL popping out of a tunnel in Hainan to launch a mach10 missile can reach Darwin in 20 minutes. AKA no defense/offense dichotomy, rocketforce can also do anti area/access denial, i.e. when targetting Guam, forward bases in 1IC. 360B buys a lot of irbms, i.e. everything up to 1-2IC/Australia north coast might as well as be "right there" from PRC theatre/IRBM perspective. Recipriocally AU can also do this from upside down land. Is AU better served with risking forward positioned SSGN with 100 x 2000 km cruise missile sized cells or for same price, 400 x 5000km land based hypersonics that can cover the theatre, plus distributed for more survivablity. IMO Australia has options other than SSGN to bring the fight north 5000km versus US trying to bring the fight west 10000km. Especially considering the maritime choke points across 1IC. Question is: which options better for AU to spend 360B to have some sort of medium / long range fires into SCS / IndoPac theatre. Considering SSGNs will lock in procurement for 50+ years. Especially considering hulls won't be in water in meaningful numbers for 20+ years while PRC ASW capablities are growing. Meanwhile, PLA is also coordinating land, sea, air at likely greater relative scale than what US+co are projected to bring in theatre, which increases challenges of subsurface survivability with time. IMO all the trendlines are against locking in on eggs in basket of expensive subsurface. It's gamble on purely warfighting value, which cannot be seperated from procurement economics, as in opportunity cost of what other warfighting capabilities that 360B can buy, and sustainment economics, as in SSGNs are such big investments that it will constrain future procurement options. Decommissioning nuclear will make even divestment hard. My feeling is AU better off with some IAPs for near shore defense, and missiles / B21s for long range fires / cheaper per unit procurements that enables future pivot. But as expensive as AUKUS is, on paper it has more domestic $$$ potential, but strategically bad gamble.