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There's a lot to unpack in this article. There's several points it gets wrong, and several others in which an assertion is made but then fails to mention the co

There's a lot to unpack in this article. There's several points it gets wrong, and several others in which an assertion is made but then fails to mention the compensating factors or later negates them in the piece. I'm not in the Navy, but I've worked in and studied this space for a long time (and have talked to many who do) so I'll share what I know. - The submarines (boats!) like the USS Minnesota are fast-attack submarines. Their primary mission is anti-shipping and sea control, not nuclear deterrence. While there's some talk I understand of bringing back the nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk which the Virginia-class could then carry; this is not their primary mission. The Ohios and follow on Columbias will do this. The fast-attack subs will to counter the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - I've seen a variety of articles over the past several years talking about how AI and advanced signal processing will make submarines obsolete. This article does the same, but is very vague on the details, then proceeds to state how there's things that complicate this (drones, other traffic.) When they say "AI", what I think they really mean is machine learning, and certainly, this helps. But noise is still subject to the inverse square law, and so there's no magical detection of everything everywhere even if advanced processing makes it a lot easier than before. It's also important to point out that this works in both directions. So if the PLAN is using better sensors and processing, you bet the U.S. and other navies are as well. - Which brings me to this point that the article doesn't address. "If not the submarine, then what?" The Chieftain (youtube) did a great video on this when there was a lot of talk on the tank being obsolete after watching battles in Ukraine. (He disarms this pretty well). While there are new threats to submarines, the type gives capabilities that aircraft and surface ships cannot match, and until such a combination of features comes about that fulfills the same roles and provides the same effects as a submarine, then it won't be replaced. - I wanna touch on the AUKUS bit, as this article starts taking swipes at it for its expense, states that the submarines will be easily detectable, but then says "just get AIP boats (Air independent propulsion)." There's a valid debate that can occur over what the best bang-for-the-buck is for Australia, and some questionable aspects about the deal (like whether we can actually build the boats on time). But in my opinion, Australia had a very valid reason for going that route that the author glosses over when touting AIP boats. They do not even remotely reach the capabilities of a nuclear boat. AIP boats are something of a misnomer; they do need oxygen, they just carry it with them. It allows them to stay submerged longer, but they're still carrying a much less energy dense fuel, and now they have to carry even more of it underwater. This is fine for Europe's needs, where most operations are going to be close to shore and not far from their bases such as in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Mediterranean. AIP is an excellent choice there! But the Pacific is vast, Australia is vast, and those boats are too short ranged and too slow to get anywhere they need to be within a reasonable amount of time in a conflict. Is Australia fights, they're going to want to do with their allies north, and that means in the South China Sea or Philippine Sea, not outside Darwin. The French boats they were originally ordering wouldn't give them that ability, and given they were hopelessly late as it was, they decided to go with a better option. Does Australia need to project that far north? Valid question. If they want a stay-at-home navy, go AIP. But they want to be part of the allied force, so they need something that can really endure and project, and that means 30+ knots sustained for thousands of kilometers. AIP boats can't do that.

_xerces_ 2y ago
The vastness of the Pacific and indeed the planet's oceans is something I noticed was missing from the article. I think of it in terms of detection, you can have the sophisticated technology and perhaps focus it on one area or choke point, but in general it will be very hard to search the entire ocean for a nuclear ballistic missile sub. Drop a submarine-sized object at a random location on land (a much, much smaller search space) and I bet it would take a long time to find despite all the earth observation satellites at our disposal. The oceans are much bigger, and have a whole other dimension (depth) and the the subs move.
maxglute 2y ago
> fast attack subs / aukus IMO (western) subsurface analysis dance around just how stupid expensive these platforms are relative to opportunity cost of other aquisitions or potential counter measures. Writings will acknowledge nuke boats are pricy multi billion dollar platforms/programs, but don't go the extra step to show the math that each VLS/torpedo tube/cell/unit of fire on a nuke boat costs $100m to hull around, approaching $200m on SSNX, and that's only with more compact TLAMs/cruise missiles... subsonic munitions with very high interception rate - hence gamble on stealth shaping, but doesn't really alter physics that slow munitions are easy to intercept. Extrapolate to more performant but larger prospective hypersonics and you can x2 that multiplier. Factor in usually 1/3 or 1/2 are deployed at any given time (rest training or maintainence) and value proposition gets even more stupid / nonsensical. Then factor in multi week round trip (port and back to theatre) for reloads unless at sea replenishment gets figured out. A B21 costs 700-800m, and can carry much more more ordinances per $ , with significantly greater turnaround. Western nuke boats supremely expensive platform during war per unit of fire, rationalized by increased survivability. But if equation starts biasing toward detection, that rationalization breaks down. > no magical detection of everything everywhere / AI We may reach point where where detections/sensors can functionally prevent nuke boats from operating permissively - negating their advantage. Meanwhile quietting has reached returns technical floor. PRC throwing out lots claims of better / cheaper detection methods as they build out their ASW (SQUIDS/ELF waves etc) last few years. Operationally this means better sensors with longer detection range maybe able pickup subs beyond their torpedo range in fleet, or less # of platforms can significantly extend detection bubble/coverage. On the extreme end, you have programs like DARPA ACTUV (I'm sure PRC has their alternative) which relies on dirt cheap surface UVs that just permenantly shadows subs once they leave port, costs $10,000 per day to operate vs $500,000-$1,000,000 for ASW destroyer (US/DARPA estimates, PRC will be lower), i.e. if PRC can push ELF detector ranges, they can basically park ASW platforms right outisde of 24nm contiguous zone off any western sub port (claiming FONAP) and shadow. TLDR is if likely future trend since PRC got into ASW game (relatively recent) is counter to subs is evolving rapidly, likely getting much cheaper, while western subs are getting more expensive, and are multi decade programs that locks in strategic capabilities. Empahsis/caveate on "western" subs - PRC/PLAN just extended their nuke boat production lines to 4-8 hulls per year. Meaning they see value in nuke boats, but their value proposition per hull =/= USN (or AUKUS). Doubt they'll be paying 6-8 billion per boat. >If not the submarine, then what For sea control, there's always PLA rockeforce / air launch AShMs model. 360Billion can buy a lot of mobile IRBM + TELs in hardened shelters to take out shipping (and other targets). 360B doesn't buy a lot of subs, half of which likely will be destroyed in port because they're juicy targets. There's good chance SCS will be so packed with PLA ASW going forward that SSNs will be operating outside of 1IC, in which case subs will stuck in AIP territory off AU coast anyway. There's arguably economical/better/future proof alternatives for shit hits fan. But AUKUS / nuke boats are "good" peacetime procurements, good for photo ops / propaganda / posturing, good for recycling 100s of billions into local economies if AU can actually get the domestic production / supply chain in place. Hence IMO AUKUS will fall through if ends up funnelling 100s of billions into US/UK industry instead of AU (which is where things seem to be moving towards).

_xerces_ 2y ago

The vastness of the Pacific and indeed the planet's oceans is something I noticed was missing from the article. I think of it in terms of detection, you can have the sophisticated technology and perhaps focus it on one area or choke point, but in general it will be very hard to search the entire ocean for a nuclear ballistic missile sub. Drop a submarine-sized object at a random location on land (a much, much smaller search space) and I bet it would take a long time to find despite all the earth observation satellites at our disposal. The oceans are much bigger, and have a whole other dimension (depth) and the the subs move.

maxglute 2y ago

> fast attack subs / aukus IMO (western) subsurface analysis dance around just how stupid expensive these platforms are relative to opportunity cost of other aquisitions or potential counter measures. Writings will acknowledge nuke boats are pricy multi billion dollar platforms/programs, but don't go the extra step to show the math that each VLS/torpedo tube/cell/unit of fire on a nuke boat costs $100m to hull around, approaching $200m on SSNX, and that's only with more compact TLAMs/cruise missiles... subsonic munitions with very high interception rate - hence gamble on stealth shaping, but doesn't really alter physics that slow munitions are easy to intercept. Extrapolate to more performant but larger prospective hypersonics and you can x2 that multiplier. Factor in usually 1/3 or 1/2 are deployed at any given time (rest training or maintainence) and value proposition gets even more stupid / nonsensical. Then factor in multi week round trip (port and back to theatre) for reloads unless at sea replenishment gets figured out. A B21 costs 700-800m, and can carry much more more ordinances per $ , with significantly greater turnaround. Western nuke boats supremely expensive platform during war per unit of fire, rationalized by increased survivability. But if equation starts biasing toward detection, that rationalization breaks down. > no magical detection of everything everywhere / AI We may reach point where where detections/sensors can functionally prevent nuke boats from operating permissively - negating their advantage. Meanwhile quietting has reached returns technical floor. PRC throwing out lots claims of better / cheaper detection methods as they build out their ASW (SQUIDS/ELF waves etc) last few years. Operationally this means better sensors with longer detection range maybe able pickup subs beyond their torpedo range in fleet, or less # of platforms can significantly extend detection bubble/coverage. On the extreme end, you have programs like DARPA ACTUV (I'm sure PRC has their alternative) which relies on dirt cheap surface UVs that just permenantly shadows subs once they leave port, costs $10,000 per day to operate vs $500,000-$1,000,000 for ASW destroyer (US/DARPA estimates, PRC will be lower), i.e. if PRC can push ELF detector ranges, they can basically park ASW platforms right outisde of 24nm contiguous zone off any western sub port (claiming FONAP) and shadow. TLDR is if likely future trend since PRC got into ASW game (relatively recent) is counter to subs is evolving rapidly, likely getting much cheaper, while western subs are getting more expensive, and are multi decade programs that locks in strategic capabilities. Empahsis/caveate on "western" subs - PRC/PLAN just extended their nuke boat production lines to 4-8 hulls per year. Meaning they see value in nuke boats, but their value proposition per hull =/= USN (or AUKUS). Doubt they'll be paying 6-8 billion per boat. >If not the submarine, then what For sea control, there's always PLA rockeforce / air launch AShMs model. 360Billion can buy a lot of mobile IRBM + TELs in hardened shelters to take out shipping (and other targets). 360B doesn't buy a lot of subs, half of which likely will be destroyed in port because they're juicy targets. There's good chance SCS will be so packed with PLA ASW going forward that SSNs will be operating outside of 1IC, in which case subs will stuck in AIP territory off AU coast anyway. There's arguably economical/better/future proof alternatives for shit hits fan. But AUKUS / nuke boats are "good" peacetime procurements, good for photo ops / propaganda / posturing, good for recycling 100s of billions into local economies if AU can actually get the domestic production / supply chain in place. Hence IMO AUKUS will fall through if ends up funnelling 100s of billions into US/UK industry instead of AU (which is where things seem to be moving towards).