3 ms·

Ok, thanks for this latest reply. I thought your 7-point jest syllogism was a sarcastic response to my two most recent comments (made 2-3 days ago) so I didn't

Ok, thanks for this latest reply. I thought your 7-point jest syllogism was a sarcastic response to my two most recent comments (made 2-3 days ago) so I didn't bother adding to what I'd already said; so if I seem to have ignored half of what you wrote, that's why. I agree, let's keep everything here from now on. I will reply to this comment soon.

mannykannot 2y ago
The 7-step argument for materialism I have presented above is not intended to be sarcasm. I might be guilty of presenting a parody, in that it closely resembles your argument in most respects, but it has a serious purpose - an attempt to focus attention on the need for statements to be sufficiently well-defined and justifiable that a reasonable skeptic could find them persuasive. The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument.
- geye1234 2y ago
  Well I'll get back properly as soon as I can, tomorrow I hope, but premise 6 of your 7-point sequence is false (or, if you prefer, we don't agree on it). Indeed, it seems question-begging, but this is so obvious that I assume you have something else in mind...
  - mannykannot 2y ago
    Remember what I said: The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. I mentioned a while back that you cannot justify your conclusion by being aloof (or vague, for that matter) about the argument for it. Note that this nominal counter-argument does not render irrelevant the question of what you mean by 'likeness', and whether it differs from the sort of correspondence that information flow along causal chains can bring about. In fact, if you do not say anything definite, I can simply assert, as a premise, that they are the same thing, and rephrase this nominal counter-argument accordingly.
    - geye1234 2y ago
      > Far from adding any specificity to what you mean by likeness, your Dec. 12 post [1] continues to avoid doing so. Very good. My "theory", if you must call it that, is Aristotelian moderate realism. A full discussion of what I mean by "likeness" would necessarily invoke concepts from that worldview. So it would therefore involve debating the truth/falsehood of said worldview. I don't want to do that for two reasons: first because it'd take the scope of the discussion far beyond whether thought can be material or not, and time is a big constraining factor. And secondly, we'd just be re-inventing the wheel. You'll find moderate realism ably defended by several authors who I can recommend if you're interested, and no doubt you'll know of your own list of attempted debunkings. But as a compromise, I can propose the following partial definition: Two objects are alike if they are the same in some respect. So an apple and a banana are the same in that they are both fruit (and this works even if categorizations of this sort are merely conventional), but different in that one is red and the other yellow. More formally, we could say that A and B are alike if we can predicate X of both A and B. As a corollary, A and B are entirely un-alike if we cannot predicate anything of both A and B. If you're good to go with that we can proceed. It would then be necessary to ask (1) Whether a thought must be like its object (using the definition just given) in order for it to be about its object; (2) If so, in what manner it must be like its object; (3) Whether said manner can be material. I don't think "the same" can be usefully (verbally) defined, since there is a point at which verbal definitions involve defining words whose meaning is more-clear in terms of those whose meaning is less-clear. > The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. It is possible I misunderstand you, but it doesn't appear to present me with a challenge. Premise 6 is false in any interpretation that could be given it. That is not question-begging, nor is it burden-shifting, and whether this response applies to any aspects of my own argument is precisely what we're debating. Points 1 thru 5 are unobjectionable, assuming some unusual meaning has not been assigned to any of the terms. Is your point that I'm stating the opposite of premise 6 in my argument without justification?
      - mannykannot 2y ago

mannykannot 2y ago

The 7-step argument for materialism I have presented above is not intended to be sarcasm. I might be guilty of presenting a parody, in that it closely resembles your argument in most respects, but it has a serious purpose - an attempt to focus attention on the need for statements to be sufficiently well-defined and justifiable that a reasonable skeptic could find them persuasive. The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument.

geye1234 2y ago
Well I'll get back properly as soon as I can, tomorrow I hope, but premise 6 of your 7-point sequence is false (or, if you prefer, we don't agree on it). Indeed, it seems question-begging, but this is so obvious that I assume you have something else in mind...
- mannykannot 2y ago
  Remember what I said: The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. I mentioned a while back that you cannot justify your conclusion by being aloof (or vague, for that matter) about the argument for it. Note that this nominal counter-argument does not render irrelevant the question of what you mean by 'likeness', and whether it differs from the sort of correspondence that information flow along causal chains can bring about. In fact, if you do not say anything definite, I can simply assert, as a premise, that they are the same thing, and rephrase this nominal counter-argument accordingly.
  - geye1234 2y ago
    > Far from adding any specificity to what you mean by likeness, your Dec. 12 post [1] continues to avoid doing so. Very good. My "theory", if you must call it that, is Aristotelian moderate realism. A full discussion of what I mean by "likeness" would necessarily invoke concepts from that worldview. So it would therefore involve debating the truth/falsehood of said worldview. I don't want to do that for two reasons: first because it'd take the scope of the discussion far beyond whether thought can be material or not, and time is a big constraining factor. And secondly, we'd just be re-inventing the wheel. You'll find moderate realism ably defended by several authors who I can recommend if you're interested, and no doubt you'll know of your own list of attempted debunkings. But as a compromise, I can propose the following partial definition: Two objects are alike if they are the same in some respect. So an apple and a banana are the same in that they are both fruit (and this works even if categorizations of this sort are merely conventional), but different in that one is red and the other yellow. More formally, we could say that A and B are alike if we can predicate X of both A and B. As a corollary, A and B are entirely un-alike if we cannot predicate anything of both A and B. If you're good to go with that we can proceed. It would then be necessary to ask (1) Whether a thought must be like its object (using the definition just given) in order for it to be about its object; (2) If so, in what manner it must be like its object; (3) Whether said manner can be material. I don't think "the same" can be usefully (verbally) defined, since there is a point at which verbal definitions involve defining words whose meaning is more-clear in terms of those whose meaning is less-clear. > The challenge it presents you with is to refute it with a non- question-begging, non- burden-shifting response that would not apply, mutatis mutandis, to your own argument - and for that, it would be helpful if you list your premises as I have done. It is possible I misunderstand you, but it doesn't appear to present me with a challenge. Premise 6 is false in any interpretation that could be given it. That is not question-begging, nor is it burden-shifting, and whether this response applies to any aspects of my own argument is precisely what we're debating. Points 1 thru 5 are unobjectionable, assuming some unusual meaning has not been assigned to any of the terms. Is your point that I'm stating the opposite of premise 6 in my argument without justification?
    - mannykannot 2y ago