> they can attack it before it reboots. But they can do that anyway? If they would guess your password or exploit your OS from the lock screen then they get ac

> they can attack it before it reboots. But they can do that anyway? If they would guess your password or exploit your OS from the lock screen then they get access to your files even if the running OS is the one certified by the hardware. > most of the value is in the parts, so they don't need your data. You need to make the parts useless for repairs so it's not worth stealing it. Putting aside that "make the parts useless for repairs" is an obvious misfeature that will be used against you by the manufacturer, it's also orthogonal to boot loader signing etc. Making the parts "useless for repairs" would also be better achieved by making new and used repair parts available for competitive prices, driving down the cost of repairs to the point that stealing devices for repair parts isn't a lucrative endeavor. For example, make sure that traded-in devices never get crushed if they could be scavenged for parts to be sold into the repair market, providing a plentiful supply of used parts instead of making them scarce enough to be worth stealing.