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The problem with the Boltzmann brain, and the reason you’re almost certainly not one, is that if you are one then your senses have no relation to reality - incl

• asdasdsddd 2y ago
  The point of descarte is that you dont know anything about anything, and in my opinion, all of his bad arguments begin when he starts stating his certainties, except for his first one.
• CamperBob2 2y ago
  Also, any line of inquiry that applies probabilistic arguments to evolution-based questions is already off in the weeds. The brains in our bodies didn't arise as a result of pure random organization, but developed incrementally in a direction that maximized reproductive fitness. There is no reason to think that brains appearing in isolated space at random, complete with memories, would ever be a thing. So it's simply not meaningful to ask about the relative odds of these two positions.
  • empath75 2y ago
    > There is no reason to think that brains appearing in isolated space at random, complete with memories, would ever be a thing. There are only a limited amount of physical states possible in a given volume and given an infinite amount of time and space, all of them will happen an infinite amount of times.
    • wutwutwat 2y ago
      I disagree. I once had someone say that if you were to smash an iphone into tiny tiny pieces and put it into a plastic bag and shake it, given enough time, it would reassemble itself into a working iphone, the pieces randomly ending up where they need to be in order to operate like it did originally. While it is technically possible for that to happen, the probability of the intricacies that make up the iphone's circuits and screen, the chemicals that make up the battery, etc, assembling themselves into a complete and working phone, even on an infinite timeline, is not that high. And it could, in theory, never actually happen, since if there is still time that you can move forward into, there's still the chance that the moment the iphone assembles itself into a working phone lies somewhere in the future, and always will. It could just never happen before the heat death of the universe. Possibility does not guarantee probability.
      • kstrauser 2y ago
        I'm not sure. Quantum tunneling is a thing. Given the possibility of particles deciding to spontaneously just up and teleport to a nearby location, the available options increase significantly.
        • wutwutwat 2y ago
          > particles deciding to spontaneously just up and teleport to a nearby location that all but guarantees that it would never happen imo... and also shows that we have no clue how the universe actually works, and likely never will
      • TheGrassyKnoll 2y ago
        Eternity is a LOT of time...
        • psd1 2y ago
          Actually no, it's -1/12 of a second
      • empath75 2y ago
• margalabargala 2y ago
  I agree with your initial argument about why we aren't Boltzmann brains, but I don't think that the same argument follows regarding the simulation hypothesis. A simulation would imply a set of rules being set up, of which your senses, and the reality they experience, are an emergent property. That is, there are rules, and your senses are generally consistent with whatever they are. With a Boltzmann brain, there's no reason whatsoever to think that any senses are consistent from one moment to the next or that any action can predictably yield any reaction. It would all just be random.
  • frotaur 2y ago
    What OP is saying, I think, is that the argument that led us to believe that Boltzmann Brains are more likely than normal brains is itself product of the physics of the world we experience. But then, if we conclude that we must be a BB, there is no reason for the physics of the universe in which this BB exists to be the same as the physics of the universe we experience. Hence, the argument breaks down, because BB are only very likely in the 'simulated universe', but have no reason to be in the 'real universe' (which has no reason to abide by the same laws of physics). In other words, the assumption that we are a BB, because they are so much more likely, invalidates the argument that BBs are much more likely.
    • wruza 2y ago
      Whatever the physics of the parent universe are, they either prohibit BBs (and then that universe would be ours, which it presumably isn’t) or are unlikely to affect BBs in a way that disallows creating BBs that observe a similar universe. It’s akin to “why tf I’m a human on Earth 2024 of all planets and things” argument. Well, four reasons: you’re, a human, here, now. Even if we assume that this universe we observe as BBs is as well the parent universe, it can produce not only human BBs obviously and not only coherent experiences. Complete nonsense is normal here too. So if a universe allows for BBs (iow, spontaneous temporary observers with state that somehow produces the me-is-observing effect), it allows for all sorts of experiences, and given enough iterations could reconstruct itself and everything imaginable and unimaginable in a sequence of arbitrary length. “You’re certainly not”doesn’t follow here. It may be or it may be not. You’re a human, here, now.
• empath75 2y ago
  That's a good argument for why it's not worth spending a lot of time being concerned about your own ontological status, but it's not really an argument against the concept or the math behind it. It's a conclusion one could derive from some fairly non-controversial assumptions, and if we're agreeing that the conclusion is wrong, the problem with the chain of logic and math needs to be found.
  • frotaur 2y ago
    The conclusion only holds if you assume that you yourself are not a BB. Yes, in our universe, the laws of physics predict that BBs are much more likely than normal brains, given you wait long enough. However, the moment you assume that then it must mean that you yourself are a BB, the argument breaks down. Because the huge probability of BB applies only to the laws of physics of the universe you live in; if you are a BB, the laws of physics of your universe have no reason to be the same as the laws of physics in the actual universe, where the BB exists. Thus, you can make no prediction on the likelihood of a BB arising, since you don't know the physics of the actual universe.
    • jvanderbot 2y ago
      I'm confused. We make predictions about things we don't fully understand all the time. And about things we cannot possibly perceive. We do so by recognizing patterns across things we can see, and probing the relationship to the things we cannot. (See could mean any perception). It's not guaranteed we could do that, even in our universe it's not guaranteed, but it's also not ruled out.
• weare138 2y ago
  I think there's an even more interesting implication of Boltzmann brains. The non-local universe is infinite in both time and space and when you're dealing with infinities of time and space two axioms become true. Everything that can occur has to occur and nothing can occur only once. So if intelligent life was able to form in our local universe we would have to assume higher intelligence spontaneously arose, AKA Boltzmann brains, in the non-local universe and exists infinitely.
  • bongodongobob 2y ago
    That's not true. The expansion of Pi is infinite, but that doesn't mean you can find every string of numbers in it, I believe that's still an open question. Just because you have an infinity, doesn't mean it contains everything an infinite amount of times. The Cantor set is a good example.
• egypturnash 2y ago
  A lot of religions can be interpreted in such a way as to essentially say "the entire real world is just a very complex simulation being played out by the Divine"; there there is no real world to know about, just thoughts in the Mind of God.
• sandgiant 2y ago
  Well no, that's not the reason why we're not Boltzmann Brains. A Boltzmann Brain is perfectly capable of believing that it is sensing reality in exactly the same way that your brain believes so. It is worth reading the section "Modern reactions to the Boltzmann brain problem" in the article to understand why the Boltzmann Brain is a useful thought experiment.
  • GoblinSlayer 2y ago
    A Boltzmann brain can be identical to evolved brain, but it can also be different, because it's not constrained by evolution.
• daseiner1 2y ago
  My chief complaint is that it’s functionally equivalent to belief in God. It strikes me as fundamentally the same instinct but reinterpreted in a manner palatable to the “i’m very logical and rational” crowd.
  • int_19h 2y ago
    Belief in God implies some effect on one's behavior, unless you believe in a completely impersonal Prime Mover that retires thereafter. The notion that one is a Boltzmann brain doesn't really change anything. If you are, there's absolutely nothing you can do about it. So the only sensible thing is to assume that you aren't, regardless of probabilities.
    • FabHK 2y ago
      I've seen a paper (probably by Bostrom) deducing normative statements ("oughts") from the simulation hypothesis (purely descriptive, "is"). Namely: the grad students running these simulations are more likely to switch off boring simulations. Thus, if we want to keep living in this world, we should strive to make it interesting. I must say, with Trump, Brexit, war, and more Trump: Well done, folks!
      • GoblinSlayer 2y ago
        Our world is boring though, cf Boötes Void. Those transcendental extrauniversal aliens invented quantum physics, what do you expect them to believe? If their world can create such immense simulations, maybe it's because their world is too fabulous and they look for serenity.
  • ndsipa_pomu 2y ago
    I don't agree. A belief in a god/gods generally also includes beliefs about what that god(s) wants or does. A Boltzmann brain would have no special powers apart from what a (very) specific arrangement of particles would have. There's no hint of them operating outside physics at all. Also, there is at least a connection to experimental physics in that we can measure "virtual" particles (e.g. Casimir effect) and can calculate their probabilities etc. There's no such underlying experiment for God(s) that I'm aware of.
• ewzimm 2y ago
  The falsifiable part of something like the simulation hypothesis has to do with nested sets. If the reality we exist in is capable of producing everything that would be necessary for a conscious being to experience a convincing reality within its available resources and computational power, then the fact of consciousness is not sufficient to conclude that the reality in which we operate does not exist inside another reality with the same capability to produce an internal model of reality sufficient for supporting consciousness. As you said, it does not definitively tell us anything about the reality in which that simulation exists other than that it has the same property that we experience of being capable of hosting a nested reality sufficient for supporting consciousness. Although we can't specify particular aspects of that reality, we are capable of mathematically representing potential properties of universes that have the capability to host a nested simulation. None of this provides certainty, but it provides a basis of exploring possibilities, and actual understanding requires methods beyond the hypothesis of a larger reality. Physics provides us a lot of ideas about the potential for the nature of reality and methods for testing and falsifying them but is not in itself sufficient. We don't need to find all the answers in one line of inquiry. The holographic principle of string theory is one example of a type of simulation existing inside a larger reality but far from the only one.
  • pydry 2y ago
    The part you said is falsifiable doesnt sound to me to be in the slightest bit falsifiable.
    • ewzimm 2y ago
      It's possible to run an experiment to see if a conscious entity could be convinced that a simulated reality was real. Hard to do ethically since consent would invalidate the illusion, but possible to demonstrate convincing virtual reality with computer generated sensory experiences. Models like the holographic principle can be tested both mathematically and through experiment. Full tests are beyond our current capabilities but not unfalsifiable in theory.
      • pydry 2y ago
• kelnos 2y ago
  I don't think that's actually a problem with the Boltzmann brain concept; I think it's just a reason why we don't want it to be the actual representation of reality. I've chosen not to care; if I'm a BB, or even just a character in a simulation, my life and choices still have meaning to me -- whatever I actually am -- and that's what I've decided is important.
  • XorNot 2y ago
    I mean the more interesting part to me is that probability comes into play: consider the age you live in. If you get to a historically conventional age for dying of old age, but then boom clinical immortality comes along, well that would feel technologically appropriate and yet be awfully convenient timing. I'll be happy if it happens, but squint-eyes a little that it did.
• FabHK 2y ago
  > It’s all unfalsifiable. That might make it unscientific (in Popper's philosophy), but not impossible or implausible.
• qingcharles 2y ago
  This is exactly what a Boltzmann Brain would say...