A lot here! I actually did read your comment about Andy Bryant, BTW -- and it sent me down several different rabbit holes and probably delayed my own piece by a

A lot here! I actually did read your comment about Andy Bryant, BTW -- and it sent me down several different rabbit holes and probably delayed my own piece by an hour or two. ;) High order bit: I absolutely agree that the board is/was/has been a huge problem that bears ultimately culpability here. There are quite a few other pieces out there (including your comment) that rightfully take the board apart -- and if you have real disdain for the board, you should absolutely listen to Ben Thompson going open loop on them.[0] That said: you are letting Gelsinger off the hook when you shouldn't. If Gelsinger wanted to cut the dividend and the "board wouldn't let him", there is an exceedingly simple solution to that problem -- and Gelsinger didn't take it. He supposedly made each board member commit to his IDM 2.0 strategy; he could have easily done the same about eliminating the dividend. But he didn't. On Tofino, I appreciate that you don't understand much about it. And hey, nor does Gelsinger, so you're in good company there. But do consider that it was one of the more interesting parts that Intel made, and a rare area of actual technical leadership. Unlike (say) Larrabee or Atom, it was already technically successful. Yes, it needed resources, but your assertion that it should be killed without asking the question of what it was in the first place is representative of the attitude that I find so frustrating in Intel. The issue is not Tofino; it is about the culture that killed it without bothering to so much as understand it. (Ask Meta about Springhill, and you will find a similar story, albeit in the Bob Swan era.) Finally, while I think Gelsinger was the wrong person for the job, I also think it was a mistake to fire him: I think he should have been shackled to the mast and forced to see this thing through one way or the other. The board's final mistake with respect to Gelsinger is martyring him internally, compounding the company's problems -- and making it much harder to find a successor, who, in addition to competing with TSMC, AMD and NVIDIA will need to battle the Gelsinger-sympathizing company, the board and Gelsinger himself, who doesn't seem to be going quietly. A mess, by any measure. [0] https://sharptech.fm/member/episode/gelsinger-out-at-intel-20-years-of-structural-challenges-and-strategic-blindspots-the-board-and-whats-next https://sharptech.fm/member/episode/gelsinger-out-at-intel-2...