Copyright and patent are legal privileges (specifically a time limited monopoly on a work or invention), not natural rights. The US Constitution proposes them

Copyright and patent are legal privileges (specifically a time limited monopoly on a work or invention), not natural rights. The US Constitution proposes them as a way to “promote progress in the useful arts” and specifically calls out their time-limited nature. I think that “authors life + 95 years” arguably stretches “limited time” beyond reasonableness, but I digress. There is a real cost, both to the society the law serves, and in the operation of law enforcement and judicial infrastructure needed to support copyright and patent enforcement. Even if you 100% believe in copyright and patent, it seems like a reasonable thing for the direct benefactors of copyrights and patents to substantially bear the cost of enforcement. A one-time filing fee (for patents) and nothing (for copyright) seems low. There is also a societal cost in suppression of innovation by allowing these to last long periods of time, so it seems reasonable that the cost structure should be (1) related to the value of the work to the creator/inventor, and (2) incentivize shorter times, especially if the values involved are low. I don’t fully grok Harberger taxes but it seems to me that they try to satisfy both my proposed criteria, but are flawed in that the value is stated by the inventor/author without proof. Maybe I’m misinterpreting but I see other comments to that effect. My proposal is to make the fee structure impute the value, by increasing over time. For example, we could require a fee of $1000 for issuance of a copyright or patent (separate from the application fee). The term would be for one year. The patent/copyright holder can extend for as many years as they want, but the cost goes up 10x each year. If it’s a valuable asset, you’ll keep paying until the cost of extension exceeds your perceived value. Now the value is established by the most informed party in the market. This is my proposal. You can of course tinker with lengths and amounts and increase factors. In sum the idea is that for valuable works (a Marvel Avengers movie or the patent on the RSA algorithm or a cancer drug) the copyright/patent holder will keep paying for many years until it’s not profitable anymore. For works that have little market value, they would fall into the public domain quickly and be able to help improve other works or inventions, and inhibit rent seeking. It practically eliminates the incentive for patent trolling, or for suing an artist decades later for having a beat similar to a song 40 years ago, or for establishing huge defensive patent portfolios. The economics aren’t there anymore.