2 ms·
I view (hypothetical, sufficiently good) brain upload and emulation the way I view git forks: both children are just as equally "the real one" even if only one
by ben_w 2y ago
I view (hypothetical, sufficiently good) brain upload and emulation the way I view git forks: both children are just as equally "the real one" even if only one of them is on the same physical hard drive.
Looking forward from now, both bio-me and digital-fork-me (or indeed bio-fork-me if the upload gets revented) are equally "my future self", even though they would also each be distinct beings in their own rights and not a shared consciousness over many bodies.
- someuser2345 2y agoI think that from everyone else's perspective, an ideal copy of me would be me; by the definition of "ideal copy". I, however, would not consider the copy to be me; to me, there is only one me.