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>The latter, immigration, is the single biggest factor driving the emergence of the far right. That's ironic that Merkel tried to whitewash Germany's image as

>The latter, immigration, is the single biggest factor driving the emergence of the far right. That's ironic that Merkel tried to whitewash Germany's image as a former Nazi country by accepting millions of immigrants from Middle East and Africa, but also caused the rise German nationalists which is looked at with unease.

mytailorisrich 2y ago
I think Merkel will go down in history has having made several catastrophic strategic mistakes, from nuclear to Russia to her response to the 2015 crisis in the Middle East (which may have titled the balance in the 2016 Brexit referendum, though it is unclear whether that is good or bad for Germany).
- protomolecule 2y ago
  Yes, dropping Germany's opposition[0] to further NATO expansion under Bush's pressure[1] during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a catastrophic mistake. [0] http://www.summitbucharest.gov.ro/en/doc_160.html http://www.summitbucharest.gov.ro/en/doc_160.html [1] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/0230617735 https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...
  - aguaviva 2y ago
    This is a complete reversal of facts. In fact the Bucharest Summit effectively quashed Bush's efforts and sustained Merkel's objection. Precisely to avoid pulling on Putin's braids. Indeed, she's so proud of her role in thwarting Kyiv's NATO ambitions that she can't stop bragging about it: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3e8y1qly52o https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3e8y1qly52o These ambitions were only substantially revived thanks to Putin's invasion of Ukraine in 2014. At which point Russia's objections became instantly and irrevocably moot.
    - protomolecule 2y ago
      >This is a complete reversal of facts. Here are the facts: While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow. <...> Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!” <...> Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward. Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.” After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel agreed to delete “one day” <...> <...> British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO.” The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit. <...> Moscow’s very public goal had of course been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members. That had never happened before. <...> The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete. He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is not based on promises.” [0] [0] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/0230617735 https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...

mytailorisrich 2y ago

I think Merkel will go down in history has having made several catastrophic strategic mistakes, from nuclear to Russia to her response to the 2015 crisis in the Middle East (which may have titled the balance in the 2016 Brexit referendum, though it is unclear whether that is good or bad for Germany).

protomolecule 2y ago
Yes, dropping Germany's opposition[0] to further NATO expansion under Bush's pressure[1] during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a catastrophic mistake. [0] http://www.summitbucharest.gov.ro/en/doc_160.html http://www.summitbucharest.gov.ro/en/doc_160.html [1] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/0230617735 https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...
- aguaviva 2y ago
  This is a complete reversal of facts. In fact the Bucharest Summit effectively quashed Bush's efforts and sustained Merkel's objection. Precisely to avoid pulling on Putin's braids. Indeed, she's so proud of her role in thwarting Kyiv's NATO ambitions that she can't stop bragging about it: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3e8y1qly52o https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3e8y1qly52o These ambitions were only substantially revived thanks to Putin's invasion of Ukraine in 2014. At which point Russia's objections became instantly and irrevocably moot.
  - protomolecule 2y ago
    >This is a complete reversal of facts. Here are the facts: While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow. <...> Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!” <...> Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward. Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.” After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel agreed to delete “one day” <...> <...> British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO.” The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit. <...> Moscow’s very public goal had of course been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members. That had never happened before. <...> The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete. He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is not based on promises.” [0] [0] https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/0230617735 https://www.amazon.com/Little-War-That-Shook-World/dp/023061...