3 ms·
Please learn the difference of persistence and privilege escalation versus "hiding a binary". They are certainly not trying to hide, and it has nothing to do w
by cookiengineer 2y ago
Please learn the difference of persistence and privilege escalation versus "hiding a binary".
They are certainly not trying to hide, and it has nothing to do with the initial exploit surface. You are mixing up things because you seem to be not aware how multi stage exploits work.
The article also mentioned that tomcat was targeted, but it didn't mention whether it was a zero day or a known vulnerability (like log4j vulnerabilities, for example).
- The initial access stage of that malware was a Tomcat exploit
- The privilege escalation stage was done via both userland + kernelmod, whereas userland's method was using glibc, hijacking any open() call of any process that is executed later. If you enter your sudo password any time for anything after that in any bash shell, it's escalated successfully and can install the kernel mod (that's what the .bashrc and profile entries were for).
- The persistence stage was done with a kernel mod that can now pretty much do whatever it wants.
Edit: After looking a little bit further, the initial access exploit was very likely CVE-2024-52316 [1], which is a Tomcat bug specific for that Jakarta Authentication system, given the described georegional malware campaign targets.
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52316 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52316
- INTPenis 2y agoSo when you say "intended target is KDE and Gnome" you mean target for persistence on the system? Sorry but not all of us have formal education in this field, I'm just trying to understand if you're saying that KDE and Gnome systems are vulnerable, or Tomcat web servers.
- chuckadams 2y agoKDE and Gnome desktop files are just used as launchers, they're not the actual thing being exploited. Persistent malware pretty much always separates the vector from the payload: the exploit just gets the door open, then downloads the actual malware from the C&C servers. Many vectors, one malware package. > Although we lack concrete evidence regarding the initial access vector, the presence of multiple webshells (as shown in Table 1 and described in the Webshells section) and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the Gelsemium APT group in recent years, we conclude with medium confidence that the attackers exploited an unknown web application vulnerability to gain server access.