I would say the majority of that touches on my 2nd paragraph where I mention what Matt says regarding the CEO encouraging to go with the Frontier deal instead o

I would say the majority of that touches on my 2nd paragraph where I mention what Matt says regarding the CEO encouraging to go with the Frontier deal instead of JetBlue deal but shareholders disagreed. I think Matt & I both agree the CEO was proven right here & shareholders didn't listen & suffered. I did mention a few things I don't see in there. Also doing a quick Google search I'm questioning Matt's line about the CEO saying they would not go bankrupt. > During the antitrust trial in Boston, Spirit CEO Ted Christie repeatedly told the court that the Florida-based carrier was in serious financial trouble and continued independence would not allow the carrier to be a “relevant” competitor to U.S. majors American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines. https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/airlines-lessors/analysis-spirits-bankruptcy-was-result-unintended-consequences https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/airlines-lessors/anal... I think that linked article also provides a much more realistic argument as to why blocking this M&A deal was the wrong decision: > Young and the DOJ engaged in wishful thinking and approached the proposed JetBlue-Spirit merger through the prism of an outdated view of the U.S. airline market. Even if Spirit can move through the Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection process and emerge as a restructured carrier, it will look far different than the ULCC of the previous decade Young thought he was preserving. > Spirit executives had already been talking about a “reimagination” of the model that would include premium-seating and bundled product tiers. ULCC Frontier Airlines is also moving into premium offerings, while newer entrants Avelo Airlines and Breeze Airways eschewed the no-frills concept from the start.