> It is also a very centralised model I can see why the centralisation is suboptimal (or even actively bad if I'm feeling paranoid!), but other schemes (web of

> It is also a very centralised model I can see why the centralisation is suboptimal (or even actively bad if I'm feeling paranoid!), but other schemes (web of trust, etc.) tend to end up far more complicated for the end user (or their UA). So far no one has come up with a practical alternative without some other disadvantage that would block its general adoption. > if I want to host a website, why do third parties need to issue a certificate for it just so people can connect to it? Because if we don't trust those few 3rd parties, we end up having to effectively trust every host on the Internet, which means trusting people and trusting all the people is a bad idea. Some argue that needing a trusted certificate for just a personal page is extreme, but this one of those cases where the greater good has to win out. For instance: if we train people that self-signed certs are fine to trust in some circumstances, they'll end up clicking OK to trust them in circumstances where they really shouldn't. This can seem a bit nanny-ish, but people are often dumb, or just lazy to the point where it is sometimes indistinguishable from dumb (I'm counting myself here!) so need a bit of nannying. And anyway, if your site doesn't take any input then no browser will (yet) complain about plain HTTP. > It also discourages naive experimentation When something could affect security, discouraging naive experimentation on the public network is a good thing IMO. Do those experiments more locally, or at least on hosts you don't expect the public to access.