3 ms·

I don't disagree with that, but it's still irrelevant in the context of this particular attack, because there's no main-in-the-middle component required. Yes, y

I don't disagree with that, but it's still irrelevant in the context of this particular attack, because there's no main-in-the-middle component required. Yes, you must secure the transport, and the same applies for even basic serial communications, but that's not what's happening here at all. This is an exploit of the implementation constraints at a legislate level. Engineers look at this problem and see the engineering problem, but it's cynical (albeit warranted) to believe that the engineers at BMW didn't see the same problems. I bet they are well aware of this vulnerability, but they're unable to do anything about it. There's a valuable lesson to be learned. It ties in to the old adage: be careful what you wish for, you might just get it. There's a lot of rumbling about new privacy legislation in the US, but the entire concept makes me really nervous. What are the chances that legislators understand the internet well enough to craft effective legislation? Not good, I'm afraid.

stcredzero 14y ago
> I don't disagree with that, but it's still irrelevant in the context of this particular attack, because there's no main-in-the-middle component required. Non-sequitur. If you can interpose the man in the middle, then most protocols are broken. > What are the chances that legislators understand the internet well enough to craft effective legislation? Not good, I'm afraid. From what I've seen, the average level of security knowledge in the startup community is woefully inadequate -- with almost everybody believing they are above average.
- bradleyland 14y ago
  > Non-sequitur. If you can interpose the man in the middle, then most protocols are broken. It does follow. There is no basis for the belief that the transport channel isn't secure! For all we know, it's well-encrypted. Yes, MITM is a concern with all communications that are intended to be secure. Granted. Established. Not an argument. But, it's not relevant to this attack. Even using the best crypto available won't save you if the client barfs the security keys to unauthenticated clients upon request. The challenges here are in the authentication and authorization layer, not the transport layer. But there are non-technical constraints at play. Backing up a bit, this even better illustrates the root of the problem. The way the law is written, you can never build a secure system, because the law mandates that the computer in your car trust all clients. Any system that does not secure the channel between an identified client and server is not secure. Hence, when all clients are permitted, the system is not secure by specification.

stcredzero 14y ago

> I don't disagree with that, but it's still irrelevant in the context of this particular attack, because there's no main-in-the-middle component required. Non-sequitur. If you can interpose the man in the middle, then most protocols are broken. > What are the chances that legislators understand the internet well enough to craft effective legislation? Not good, I'm afraid. From what I've seen, the average level of security knowledge in the startup community is woefully inadequate -- with almost everybody believing they are above average.

bradleyland 14y ago
> Non-sequitur. If you can interpose the man in the middle, then most protocols are broken. It does follow. There is no basis for the belief that the transport channel isn't secure! For all we know, it's well-encrypted. Yes, MITM is a concern with all communications that are intended to be secure. Granted. Established. Not an argument. But, it's not relevant to this attack. Even using the best crypto available won't save you if the client barfs the security keys to unauthenticated clients upon request. The challenges here are in the authentication and authorization layer, not the transport layer. But there are non-technical constraints at play. Backing up a bit, this even better illustrates the root of the problem. The way the law is written, you can never build a secure system, because the law mandates that the computer in your car trust all clients. Any system that does not secure the channel between an identified client and server is not secure. Hence, when all clients are permitted, the system is not secure by specification.