4 ms·
This won't make an appreciable difference if your entire db is captured by the attacker (ala LinkedIn). You are just asking them to buy a box (rent a virtual s
by SoftwareMaven 14y ago
This won't make an appreciable difference if your entire db is captured by the attacker (ala LinkedIn). You are just asking them to buy a box (rent a virtual server) with more RAM because the equals operation just became memory intensive. A machine with 128GB of RAM will still give a near-constant result to "does my test hash equal the user's password?"
"Just add more fake hashes", you say. To get around the above, you have to use billions upon billions of fake hashes. The database abuse will eventually catch up to you.
This is trying to accomplish what bcrypt and scrypt do using tunable parameters, which is force the attacker to spend significantly more to break passwords than it costs you to test passwords (because they are doing it billions of times, you are doing it once). Personally, I trust the math more.
- zaroth 14y agoThis is absolutely only to be used with bcrypt or scrypt, not instead of. Facebook has 100PB of data, but all the password salts and hashes for their 800m active users fits on a single USB stick. One maligned employee and that data can walk right out the door. The theft of all your users' passwords should make one heck of a racket on its way out of your data center. A thief should need the equivalent of a 747 to fly them out of there. With this technique, Facebook could fairly easily make their salts and hashes fill 1PB of drives. You're not sneaking out of the data center with that tucked in your sock!
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]