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I understand that monitoring and status is reasonable to optimize for cost and this comes with some tradeoffs. Loss of monitoring should not equal a loss if ser

I understand that monitoring and status is reasonable to optimize for cost and this comes with some tradeoffs. Loss of monitoring should not equal a loss if service not unless that monitoring is off line for an extended period. The actual functional control for ensuring a critical service like water is working should remain as an analog computer with something like pneumatics, or other such technology. These are robust and can continue to operate even when electronic circuits have failed. Loss of visibility, and loss of service should be separated. This should be the same even for power stations as well.

applied_heat 2y ago
I only work on power stations, but about 30 of 33 I have worked on are accessible by VPN. They aren’t staffed 24/7 and one crew will be responsible for several facilities in a geographic area. Bad weather causes problems and makes travel difficult or dangerous, so being able to control equipment remotely saves time, money or lost revenue, and is safer by avoiding dangerous travel. The ones not on VPN were owned by big enough utility to have their own private fibre networks. I am ripping out analog electronics from the 70s that nobody alive wants to support and installing PLCs with Ethernet. The attention paid to cybersecurity goes up with the size of the facility as downtime is more expensive. Failsafes preventing damage or loss of life are seperate processors from the plc and independent often redundant systems, but still digital.