3 ms·
It's a question of sizing up what resources the attacker has, versus what they will need to succeed in an attack. We want to make password cracking extremely d
by zaroth 14y ago
It's a question of sizing up what resources the attacker has, versus what they will need to succeed in an attack.
We want to make password cracking extremely difficult. It's a problem a big site should want to throw some money at.
Today, we make it hard by requiring lots of CPU. Another commenter said 'scrypt' -- yes, we want to make it hard by requiring lots of RAM too.
Here's another way to make it hard -- now you'll need to make a clean getaway with multiple TBs of data off my server too, just to hopefully steal ONE user's password.
There is a benefit here, I think.
- gibybo 14y agoOk, requiring the attacker to download several terabytes could be an interesting advantage. Could we also achieve that by inserting billions of fake users in a traditional [user, salt, hash] setup?
- px1999 14y agoYou could, but I don't really see any difference between this and just slapping many tb of unrelated data in the database - the smart attacker will realise that a bunch of accounts are fake and just join to a table that holds only data for real users before extracting the info. That's part of the elegance (well, it's something other than elegant because it uses a whole mass of data) of the original solution - all of the data could be significant in checking a single password so none can be discarded.
- zaroth 14y agoAs the OP, I'd say it's as elegant as securing your bike by locking a cinder block to it! ;-)
- dekz 14y ago> We want to make password cracking extremely difficult. It's a problem a big site should want to throw some money at. Maybe we should start heading back in the other direction, like making our stacks secure and not expecting a data leak in the first place. Sure be prepared with your time/memory hard hash constructs, it's not a solution to writing insecure code in the first place.