3 ms·

I am skeptical that this method adds any protection to a brute force attack relative to a standard implementation of PBKDF2 hashes stored with the users. With

by gibybo 14y ago

I am skeptical that this method adds any protection to a brute force attack relative to a standard implementation of PBKDF2 hashes stored with the users. With proper salts, we have no advantage cracking a password in a database of 10 users or 10 million users. LinkedIn didn't have any salts. The effectiveness of brute forcing a password is determined entirely by how many passwords they can test for a particular user (because they are salted) in a given period of time. Sure you can add tens of gigabytes of extra data that they have to search through, but your system has to search through it too so it's no different than adding extra iterations to PBKDF2.

zaroth 14y ago
It's a question of sizing up what resources the attacker has, versus what they will need to succeed in an attack. We want to make password cracking extremely difficult. It's a problem a big site should want to throw some money at. Today, we make it hard by requiring lots of CPU. Another commenter said 'scrypt' -- yes, we want to make it hard by requiring lots of RAM too. Here's another way to make it hard -- now you'll need to make a clean getaway with multiple TBs of data off my server too, just to hopefully steal ONE user's password. There is a benefit here, I think.
- gibybo 14y ago
  Ok, requiring the attacker to download several terabytes could be an interesting advantage. Could we also achieve that by inserting billions of fake users in a traditional [user, salt, hash] setup?
  - px1999 14y ago
    You could, but I don't really see any difference between this and just slapping many tb of unrelated data in the database - the smart attacker will realise that a bunch of accounts are fake and just join to a table that holds only data for real users before extracting the info. That's part of the elegance (well, it's something other than elegant because it uses a whole mass of data) of the original solution - all of the data could be significant in checking a single password so none can be discarded.
    - zaroth 14y ago
      As the OP, I'd say it's as elegant as securing your bike by locking a cinder block to it! ;-)
- dekz 14y ago
  > We want to make password cracking extremely difficult. It's a problem a big site should want to throw some money at. Maybe we should start heading back in the other direction, like making our stacks secure and not expecting a data leak in the first place. Sure be prepared with your time/memory hard hash constructs, it's not a solution to writing insecure code in the first place.

by gibybo 14y ago

zaroth 14y ago

It's a question of sizing up what resources the attacker has, versus what they will need to succeed in an attack. We want to make password cracking extremely difficult. It's a problem a big site should want to throw some money at. Today, we make it hard by requiring lots of CPU. Another commenter said 'scrypt' -- yes, we want to make it hard by requiring lots of RAM too. Here's another way to make it hard -- now you'll need to make a clean getaway with multiple TBs of data off my server too, just to hopefully steal ONE user's password. There is a benefit here, I think.

gibybo 14y ago
Ok, requiring the attacker to download several terabytes could be an interesting advantage. Could we also achieve that by inserting billions of fake users in a traditional [user, salt, hash] setup?
- px1999 14y ago
  You could, but I don't really see any difference between this and just slapping many tb of unrelated data in the database - the smart attacker will realise that a bunch of accounts are fake and just join to a table that holds only data for real users before extracting the info. That's part of the elegance (well, it's something other than elegant because it uses a whole mass of data) of the original solution - all of the data could be significant in checking a single password so none can be discarded.
  - zaroth 14y ago
    As the OP, I'd say it's as elegant as securing your bike by locking a cinder block to it! ;-)
dekz 14y ago
> We want to make password cracking extremely difficult. It's a problem a big site should want to throw some money at. Maybe we should start heading back in the other direction, like making our stacks secure and not expecting a data leak in the first place. Sure be prepared with your time/memory hard hash constructs, it's not a solution to writing insecure code in the first place.