Security experts don’t consider this a valid excuse anymore. The first task was making encryption primitives that are secure when used perfectly— it took a whil

Security experts don’t consider this a valid excuse anymore. The first task was making encryption primitives that are secure when used perfectly— it took a while, but we’ve pretty much done that: nobody expects a serious break in e.g. AES any time soon. But the next task after that is making crypto systems that are free of footguns and as hard as possible to misuse, especially when wrapped in layers of libraries, which in practice they always are. This is what’s phasing out RSA, for example— it is possible to use RSA in a completely secure way, but it’s very easy to get it wrong and it can fail catastrophically when you do. PGP has the same problem: yes, it can be used securely, but that’s not sufficient in 2024.