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The proposal is an attestation from Github, owned by Microsoft. They could instead use a cloud-based trusted execution environment on Azure, and get an attesta
by michaelt 2y ago
The proposal is an attestation from Github, owned by Microsoft.
They could instead use a cloud-based trusted execution environment on Azure, and get an attestation from some combination of Intel and Microsoft.
Or they could use a TPM and get an attestation from Infineon that the Microsoft-signed shim loaded a kernel blessed by a Microsoft-approved Linux vendor such as Canonical.
Seems to me that just trades one corporate attestation for another.
- amiga386 2y agoAnd that attestation does not affirm that the device's /usr/bin/python3 was squeaky-clean and didn't Ken-Thompson the package build process. It just affirms which machine. The trust that the machine itself is not compromised is implicit; "oh, yes, we trust Microsoft not to mess up its GitHub Actions worker VMs" What would work better is if _everybody_ could run the same CI action to produce a release tarball, and it produced identical builds, and everyone doing this could publish their findings - we can federate a heterogenous network of verifiers, rather than trust a single source's attestation