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Searle's Chinese Room Argument springs to mind: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ The idea that "human-like" behaviour will lead to self-awar

Searle's Chinese Room Argument springs to mind: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ The idea that "human-like" behaviour will lead to self-awareness is both unproven (it can't be proven until it happens) and impossible to disprove (like Russell's teapot). Yet, one common assumption of many people running these companies or investing in them, or of some developers investing their time in these technologies, is precisely that some sort of explosion of superintelligence is likely, or even inevitable. It surely is possible, but stretching that to likely seems a bit much if you really think how imperfectly we understand things like consciousness and the mind. Of course there are people who have essentially religious reactions to the notion that there may be limits to certain domains of knowledge. Nonetheless, I think that's the reality we're faced with here.

abeppu 2y ago
> The idea that "human-like" behaviour will lead to self-awareness is both unproven (it can't be proven until it happens) and impossible to disprove (like Russell's teapot). I think Searle's view was that: - while it cannot be dis-_proven_, the Chinese Room argument was meant to provide reasons against believing it - the "it can't be proven until it happens" part is misunderstanding: you won't know if it happens because the objective, externally available attributes don't indicate whether self-awareness (or indeed awareness at all) is present
- sourcepluck 2y ago
  The short version of this is that I don't disagree with your interpretation of Searle, and my paragraphs immediately following the link weren't meant to be a direct description of his point with the Chinese Room thought experiment. > while it cannot be dis-_proven_, the Chinese Room argument was meant to provide reasons against believing it Yes, like Russell's teapot. I also think that's what Searle means. > the "it can't be proven until it happens" part is misunderstanding: you won't know if it happens because the objective, externally available attributes don't indicate whether self-awareness (or indeed awareness at all) is present Yes, agreed, I believe that's what Searle is saying too. I think I was maybe being ambiguous here - I wanted to say that even if you forgave the AI maximalists for ignoring all relevant philosophical work, the notion that "appearing human-like" inevitably tends to what would actually be "consciousness" or "intelligence" is more than a big claim. Searle goes further, and I'm not sure if I follow him all the way, personally, but it's a side point.

abeppu 2y ago

> The idea that "human-like" behaviour will lead to self-awareness is both unproven (it can't be proven until it happens) and impossible to disprove (like Russell's teapot). I think Searle's view was that: - while it cannot be dis-_proven_, the Chinese Room argument was meant to provide reasons against believing it - the "it can't be proven until it happens" part is misunderstanding: you won't know if it happens because the objective, externally available attributes don't indicate whether self-awareness (or indeed awareness at all) is present

sourcepluck 2y ago
The short version of this is that I don't disagree with your interpretation of Searle, and my paragraphs immediately following the link weren't meant to be a direct description of his point with the Chinese Room thought experiment. > while it cannot be dis-_proven_, the Chinese Room argument was meant to provide reasons against believing it Yes, like Russell's teapot. I also think that's what Searle means. > the "it can't be proven until it happens" part is misunderstanding: you won't know if it happens because the objective, externally available attributes don't indicate whether self-awareness (or indeed awareness at all) is present Yes, agreed, I believe that's what Searle is saying too. I think I was maybe being ambiguous here - I wanted to say that even if you forgave the AI maximalists for ignoring all relevant philosophical work, the notion that "appearing human-like" inevitably tends to what would actually be "consciousness" or "intelligence" is more than a big claim. Searle goes further, and I'm not sure if I follow him all the way, personally, but it's a side point.