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GitHub needs to step up its security game in general. 2FA should be made mandatory. GitHub "Actions" are a catastrophe waiting to happen - very few people pin A

• aliasxneo 2y ago
  The rampant "@V1" usage for GitHub Actions has always been so disturbing to me. Even better is the fact that GitHub does all of the work of showing you who is actually using the action! So just compromise the account and then start searching for workflows with authenticated web tokens to AWS or something similar. It's probably already happening.
  • cedws 2y ago
    Exactly. It simply should not be allowed to do this. Nor maintain Actions without mandatory 2FA. All it takes is one account to be compromised to infect thousands of pipelines. Thousands of pipelines can be used to infect thousands of repos. Thousands of repos can be used to infect thousands of accounts... ad infinitum.
    • guappa 2y ago
      2FA matters very little when you have never expiring tokens.
      • dawnerd 2y ago
        And thanks to the likes of composer and similar devs end up making non expiring tokens to reduce annoyance. There needs to be a better system. Having to manually generate a token for tooling can be a drag.
      • blueflow 2y ago
        2FA also matters little if the attacker has compromised your machine. They can use your 2FA-authenticated session.
        • guappa 2y ago
          Only once… but if they can get your forever token… that's not the same.
          • GoblinSlayer 2y ago
            Once is enough.
  • OptionOfT 2y ago
    GitHub specifically recommended that you have a v1, v1.x and v1.x.x When you go from v1.5.3 to v1.5.4 you make v1.5 and v1 point to v1.5.4
    • BHSPitMonkey 2y ago
      The point is that any of those tags can be replaced maliciously, after the fact.
      • mroche 2y ago
        If tags are the way people want to work, then there needs to be a new repo class for actions which explicitly removes the ability to delete or force push tags across all branches. And enforced 2FA. Using a commit hash is the second most secure option. The first (in my eyes) is vendoring the actions you want to use in your user/org's namespace. Maintaining when/if to sync or backport upstream modifications can protect against these kinds of attacks. However, this does depend on the repo being vetted ahead of time, before being vendored.
      • robertlagrant 2y ago
        Sorry I followed up to this point - how can this be done?
        • GauntletWizard 2y ago
          From the GitHub UI, very simply. Go to a repo you administer, in the /tags page, and each tag has a ... Drop-down menu with a delete option. Then upload a new tag by that name. Tags are not automatically updated from remotes on pull (they are automatically created locally if it's a new tag). This doesn't mean that the remote can't change what the tag points to, only that it's easy to spot. Edit: and to be clear, for many years after release, this was the recommendation from the Visual Source Safe team (Yes, that team developed GitHub Actions) for managing your actions. Tell people to use "v1", then delete the tag update it each time.
          • 2y ago
  • Twirrim 2y ago
    Not that long ago Facebook was accidentally leaking information through their self hosted runners, through a very common mistake people make. https://johnstawinski.com/2024/01/11/playing-with-fire-how-we-executed-a-critical-supply-chain-attack-on-pytorch/ https://johnstawinski.com/2024/01/11/playing-with-fire-how-w... That's the second time for PyTorch, to the best of my knowledge. I know someone who found that (or something very much like it) back in 2022 and reported it, as I had to help him escalate through a relevant security contact I had at Meta.
• axus 2y ago
  What's next, checking that Releases match the code on Github?
  • jiggawatts 2y ago
    With what, a reproducible build? Madness! Madness I say!
    • blueflow 2y ago
      Having a reproducible build does not prove that the tarball contains the same source as git.
      • pkaeding 2y ago
        SLSA aims to achieve this, though, right? Specifically going from level 2 to level 3.
        • deleted 2y ago
          [deleted]
• webdevladder 2y ago
  Also the heuristic used to collapse file diffs makes it so that the most important change in a PR often can't be seen or ctrl-f'd without clicking first.
  • XorNot 2y ago
    I've always considered the wider point to be that viewing diffs inline has been a laziness inducing anti-pattern in development: if you never actually bring the code to your machine, you don't quite feel like it's "real" (i.e. even if it's not a full test, compiling and running it yourself should be something which happens. If that feels uncomfortable...then maybe there's a reason).
  • guappa 2y ago
    Blame it on go dependency lists and similar. What do you even review when it's one of those? There's thousands of lines changed and they all point to commits on other repositories. You're essentially hoping it's fine.
    • lrvick 2y ago
      Shipping code to production without evidence anyone credible has reviewed it at a minimum is negligence.
      • guappa 2y ago
        You're claiming here that you do a review of all of your dependencies?
        • lrvick 2y ago
          For security critical projects, of course. I even reproducibly bootstrap my own compilers and interpreters.
• blueflow 2y ago
  2FA is already mandatory on GitHub.
  • cedws 2y ago
    Seems I missed that change, thanks.
    • jamesfinlayson 2y ago
      It only happened in the last month or so I think.
      • guappa 2y ago
        Nah. A year maybe?
        • hifromwork 2y ago
          Six days for me: >Your account meets this criteria, and you will need to enroll in 2FA within 45 days, by November 8th, 2024 at 00:00 (UTC). After this date, your access to GitHub.com will be limited until you enroll in 2FA. Enrolling is easy, and we support several options, starting with TOTP apps and text messages (SMS) and then adding on passkeys and the GitHub Mobile app. I think the exact deadline depends on the organisation. I know that I only enabled 2FA for my throwaway work account (we don't use github at work, and I didn't want to comment using my personal one) last week.
          • guappa 2y ago
            Lucky you :D I was talking about non-work accounts that don't belong to organizations. Mine got forced to use 2fa a long time ago.
        • jamesfinlayson 2y ago
          For my personal account it was only in the last month but I think I'd been getting warnings for a while.
• OptionOfT 2y ago
  And even if you pin your actions, if they're docker actions they can replace the docker container that is at that label: https://github.com/rust-build/rust-build.action/blob/59be2eda2b24dd30430ba05988d8c6ccef4c8da0/action.yml#L56 https://github.com/rust-build/rust-build.action/blob/59be2ed...
• pushfoo 2y ago
  TL;DR: Why not add a capability/permissions model to CI? I agree that pinning commits is reasonable and that GitHub's UI and Actions system are awful. However, you said: > Maybe accounts should even require ID verification This would worsen the following problems: 1. GitHub actions are seen as "trustworthy" 2. GitHub actions lack granular permissions with default no 3. Rising incentives to attempt developer machine compromise, including via $5 wrench[1] 4. Risk of identity information being stolen via breach > It's time to take things seriously. Why not add strong capability models to CI? We have SEGFAULT for programs, right? Let's expand on the idea. Stop an action run when: * an action attempts unexpected network access * an action attempts IO on unexpected files or folders The US DoD and related organizations seem to like enforcing this at the compiler level. For example, Ada's got: * a heavily contract-based approach[2] for function preconditions * pragma capabilities to forbid using certain features in a module Other languages have inherited similar ideas in weaker forms, and I mean more than just Rust's borrow checker. Even C# requires explicit declaration to accept null values as arguments [3]. Some languages are taking a stronger approach. For example, Gren's[4] developers are considering the following for IO: 1. you need to have permission to access the disk and other devices 2. permissions default to no > We can't afford to fuck around anymore, Sadly, the "industry" seems to disagree with us here. Do you remember when: 1. Microsoft tried to ship 99% of a credit card number and SSN exfiltration tool[5] as a core OS component? 2. BSoD-as-service stopped global air travel? It seems like a great time to be selling better CI solutions. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ [1]: https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/ [2]: https://learn.adacore.com/courses/intro-to-ada/chapters/contracts.html https://learn.adacore.com/courses/intro-to-ada/chapters/cont... [3]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/csharp/language-reference/builtin-types/nullable-value-types https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/csharp/language-ref... [4]: https://gren-lang.org/ https://gren-lang.org/ [5]: https://arstechnica.com/ai/2024/06/windows-recall-demands-an-extraordinary-level-of-trust-that-microsoft-hasnt-earned/ https://arstechnica.com/ai/2024/06/windows-recall-demands-an...