I don't think I've missed the point, though it's possible I'm talking past you. I've granted what you're saying-- I don't think synthetic replacement of parts o

I don't think I've missed the point, though it's possible I'm talking past you. I've granted what you're saying-- I don't think synthetic replacement of parts of my brain should alter my identity or consciousness any more than a nap does. But that's a kind of pointless philosophy, because I'm definitely not the same person I was ten years ago, and in ten years I'll certainly not be who I am now. Synthetic replacement wouldn't change that-- if it did, then it would not be me. And if that process were enabled by technology to continue at its current pace indefinitely, I don't think that Me+100years would have much more claim to being Me' than my grandchildren would; both would be radically altered derivative products. It follows that I don't see how a synthetic brain is supposed to maintain my consciousness in the long term more than having children will. Or in brief: I don't see the question "would I still be me" as particularly interesting or useful.