2 ms·

They actually think using encryption, designed by the NSA, will protect them. Laughs in lavabit....

fooqux 2y ago
You say lavabit, but that's actually an example of them needing the private keys... so I'm not sure what you're on about there. But regardless, I've seen this argument plenty of times. However, I don't know how much tinfoil is in that hat. On one hand, I would not be surprised to learn that some of the encryption standards have backdoors in them. I'd mostly be interested in how they kept it secret for so long. But does it even matter? You're worried about backdoors in the algorithm for encryption when that's just a single link in the chain. To my knowledge, backdoors in various NSA encryption types have only been suggested and theorized about. However, we already have real world proof that hardware and software backdoors not only exist, but have been used. So, worrying about encryption being backdoored while chatting on a smart phone chock full of chips like the modem which has direct access to your phone's memory and has internet access doesn't make sense to me. But on the other hand, unless you really piss off someone in the government, they are not likely going to be worried enough about you to use any of those tools. What we really need to be worried about is any aggregation of the data about you into groups. Most likely, they can already form these groups (and let's face it, likely already are) from freely available data we willingly post online. History has already shown they don't need to use their AES backdoor to discover you are likely an "undesirable" and should be deported / placed in a camp. But even if it was hard, an intern could probably slop together an AI to scan a person's online posts and develop a persona, and that's good enough.
- webdoodle 2y ago
  > To my knowledge, backdoors in various NSA encryption types have only been suggested and theorized about. However, we already have real world proof that hardware and software backdoors not only exist, but have been used. Heart bleed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed > But on the other hand, unless you really piss off someone in the government, they are not likely going to be worried enough about you to use any of those tools. The government is made up of people, who will do illegal things, if they think they can get away with it. As there is essentially no auditing of NSA surveillance feeds (let alone other countries surveillance), so those folks can spy on almost anyone without repercussions. This all precludes the fact that most of the surveillance is actually done by private, for profit, companies that have a vested interest in keeping the surveillance beast running.
- burningChrome 2y ago
  >> To my knowledge, backdoors in various NSA encryption types have only been suggested and theorized about. Read about the Inslaw case from the 1970's. https://www.wired.com/1993/01/inslaw/ https://www.wired.com/1993/01/inslaw/ The government essentially stole software that they built back doors into and then sold to governments on both sides of the spectrum in order to track terrorists and find out what our allies governments were doing. This was started on the DOJ side, but eventually was used in several other three letter government agencies. Its not a leap to think if they've been doing this since the 1970's, they would be willing to do just about anything to continue to have access to developing encryption techniques. I think the Lavabit story is a great example of this. Like you said, there hasn't been any confirmed knowledge of this, but there is a lot of circumstantial evidence to point to the idea that if an encryption technique is developed where the government doesn't have access, that is a problem. However, they don't have any issues with all of the other standards? Makes you wonder why - right?

You say lavabit, but that's actually an example of them needing the private keys... so I'm not sure what you're on about there. But regardless, I've seen this argument plenty of times. However, I don't know how much tinfoil is in that hat. On one hand, I would not be surprised to learn that some of the encryption standards have backdoors in them. I'd mostly be interested in how they kept it secret for so long. But does it even matter? You're worried about backdoors in the algorithm for encryption when that's just a single link in the chain. To my knowledge, backdoors in various NSA encryption types have only been suggested and theorized about. However, we already have real world proof that hardware and software backdoors not only exist, but have been used. So, worrying about encryption being backdoored while chatting on a smart phone chock full of chips like the modem which has direct access to your phone's memory and has internet access doesn't make sense to me. But on the other hand, unless you really piss off someone in the government, they are not likely going to be worried enough about you to use any of those tools. What we really need to be worried about is any aggregation of the data about you into groups. Most likely, they can already form these groups (and let's face it, likely already are) from freely available data we willingly post online. History has already shown they don't need to use their AES backdoor to discover you are likely an "undesirable" and should be deported / placed in a camp. But even if it was hard, an intern could probably slop together an AI to scan a person's online posts and develop a persona, and that's good enough.

webdoodle 2y ago
> To my knowledge, backdoors in various NSA encryption types have only been suggested and theorized about. However, we already have real world proof that hardware and software backdoors not only exist, but have been used. Heart bleed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed > But on the other hand, unless you really piss off someone in the government, they are not likely going to be worried enough about you to use any of those tools. The government is made up of people, who will do illegal things, if they think they can get away with it. As there is essentially no auditing of NSA surveillance feeds (let alone other countries surveillance), so those folks can spy on almost anyone without repercussions. This all precludes the fact that most of the surveillance is actually done by private, for profit, companies that have a vested interest in keeping the surveillance beast running.
burningChrome 2y ago
>> To my knowledge, backdoors in various NSA encryption types have only been suggested and theorized about. Read about the Inslaw case from the 1970's. https://www.wired.com/1993/01/inslaw/ https://www.wired.com/1993/01/inslaw/ The government essentially stole software that they built back doors into and then sold to governments on both sides of the spectrum in order to track terrorists and find out what our allies governments were doing. This was started on the DOJ side, but eventually was used in several other three letter government agencies. Its not a leap to think if they've been doing this since the 1970's, they would be willing to do just about anything to continue to have access to developing encryption techniques. I think the Lavabit story is a great example of this. Like you said, there hasn't been any confirmed knowledge of this, but there is a lot of circumstantial evidence to point to the idea that if an encryption technique is developed where the government doesn't have access, that is a problem. However, they don't have any issues with all of the other standards? Makes you wonder why - right?