6 ms·
The attacker would need physical possession of the [key]... Depending on the use case, the attacker may also require additional knowledge including... PIN, acco
by zahlman 2y ago
The attacker would need physical possession of the [key]... Depending on the use case, the attacker may also require additional knowledge including... PIN, account password, or authentication key.
If you already had both these things, any vulnerability in the key's firmware would be moot, surely? It's hardly a surprise that 2FA can be compromised by compromising both factors.
- Sayrus 2y agoThe vulnerability allows extracting the secret key from a vulnerable device. If I remember correctly, it's after a successful auth / sign flow, which requires the login/password of the target website. I could give you my security key and you'll be able to login once. If you can extract the key, then you could login without the security key. In the context of a targeted attack, that could heavily change the impact.
- Y_Y 2y agoIf you're paranoid, of course, you're not going to trust a key that's left your possession, even if you get it back later. One it's gone it should be revoked permanently.
- chrisjj 2y agoThat presumes you'd know.
- Y_Y 2y agoIt does. If you can get my yubikey off my keyring while it's in my pocket and put it back on without my noticing then I don't know how I can defend against that.
- nativeit 2y agoSort of like how several plot points of the last Mission: Impossible movie could have been thwarted by a zipper.
- chrisjj 2y ago... in hindsight :)
- chrisjj 2y ago> If you can get my yubikey off my keyring while it's in my pocket and put it back on without my noticing Yubikey security advisory: "Due to software vulnerability, always store in pocket". :)
- GoblinSlayer 2y agoWhat is your job where you need to give your key to lieutenant Chang daily?
- water-data-dude 2y agoAnd you can store things like your PGP keys on there. I use mine for code signing, ssh, and encryption. For me it’d just be a PITA, since I don’t operate in a very sensitive or valuable area, but it could be a nightmare for someone who signs code a lot of people use, for example.
- nh2 2y agoThe whole point of a YubiKey is that it can produce inextractable keys so it cannot be forged/cloned. Without that property, might as well use a < 1$ Arduino clone that's 100x cheaper.
- GoblinSlayer 2y agoIt's a matter of safeguards. If the arduino clone is remotely extractable, then you're not saving much.
- thanksgiving 2y agoThat's the point. Yubikey can charge a premium on the assumption that what it sells is secure. If it sells old stock with known issues, what's the point? Also I returned my yubikey to my $work when my contract ended so I know at least Microsoft reuses these keys.
- chrisjj 2y ago> Also I returned my yubikey to my $work when my contract ended so I know at least Microsoft reuses these keys. Or destroys them.
- cuu508 2y agoAre there < 1$ Arduino clones? How compatible are they with yubikeys? Are there any from trusted manufacturers? Any pointers?
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- drhuseynov 2y agoNot $1, but you can get a JavaCardOS card and upload a FIDO applet yourself https://github.com/token2/pin_plus_firmware https://github.com/token2/pin_plus_firmware https://github.com/BryanJacobs/FIDO2Applet https://github.com/BryanJacobs/FIDO2Applet Probably will cost 5USD
- bostik 2y agoThe attacker would have to take the targeted YubiKey physically apart to get access to the Infineon chip. Then, after performing enough successful FIDO2 challenges (ie. logins with phished credentials) they would need to put the device back together, and do so without the victim noticing that their YubiKey has been physically compromised. The keys are tamper-evident. The attack is not impossible, and surely fits within the capabilities of nation state actors. For majority of other users it's a theoretical attack.
- chrisjj 2y ago> The keys are tamper-evident. No. Attacker replaces the shell.
- bostik 2y agoSo in your threat model the attacker is someone who has the resources to target you individually (plausible for high-value targets), the capability and capacity to further develop the physical field attack kit (current cost at ~11k for lab condition hardware), and can haul around essentially a mobile electrics oven - approximate size between a fusion splicer and a small 3D printer - to re-shell a decapped YubiKey. I'm discounting the need to conduct phishing. That comes for free. I'll also give you that the victim may be rather unlikely to spot that their YubiKey has been replaced with a freshly manufactured copy. For those kinds of capabilities you're still looking at nation state actors or very motivated enterprises.
- chrisjj 2y ago> essentially a mobile electrics oven - approximate size between a fusion splicer and a small 3D printer - to re-shell a decapped YubiKey. Not at all. Superglue is ample. > For those kinds of capabilities you're still looking at nation state actors or very motivated enterprises. And that's comfort?
- datadrivenangel 2y agoNot comfort, but threat model. Nation state actors have the resources to destroy me. Defending fully against them is cost prohibitive. I'll take basic actions to make it more expensive though. My threat model is much less well resources actors who would happily sim-swap or password-stuff, etc, and there a ubikey is enough to foil those attacks. I have locks on my doors to prevent random teenagers and miscreants from walking in, not to prevent people motivated enough to pick the locks, break a window, or go through a wall.
- jdyer9 2y agoAs another commenter started to point out, the risk is essentially cloning the key. So, if you were out to dinner and it was cloned while you were out, you might not realize you'd been compromised whereas if it was stolen, it might too late, but you'd know. It seems that for many/most people the risk is low, but anyone at risk of a state sponsored attack should be aware. For the threat model of keeping out random online attackers with no physical access, it seems this vulnerability doesn't matter.