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Upcoming changes to the DNSSEC root trust anchor
- progbits 2y agoThis looks like routine key rotation. One year before it even starts being used and one more year before the old one gets revoked.
- ggm 2y agoYes, but the routine here is still (in decades terms) new. So, declaring things you do which are "normal" is part & parcel of making this experience as good as it can be. "nothing to see here, move along" is not a good posture. "in case you're interested" is begging a question: should I be? Simply declaring/reminding, to my mind is the best position. As normal, we're doing the normal thing. this is the gating time. Read more here.
- progbits 2y agoSorry if it came across that way, I wasn't trying to be dismissive. However the title "upcoming changes" made me think this was some unexpected / breaking change. I think something like "Root trust anchor rotation: you have 1 (or 2) year to update" would be more accurate.
- ggm 2y agoYea, works. The intent wasn't to cause panic or concern of that I am sure.
- tptacek 2y agoTechnically this isn't a rotation; as I recall, the last attempted rotation was a fiasco?
- sybercecurity 2y agoIt was delayed, but was successful. The available metrics at the time showed that many validators did not pick up the new key, or did not store it in stable memory so every time a new VM/container/whatever started up, it had the old key. Once those were fixed, the rollover completed. That's the problem with doing maintenance on infrastructure used by every host on the Internet. Though efforts to replace DNS with a more distributed model has never succeeded (yet).
- tptacek 2y agoYeah I'm not making a point about DNSSEC or its alternatives so much as just pointing out that the last rotation was a big story, and that this is not a big story.
- dc396 2y agoIt was a big story because (a) it was the first time it was attempted; and (b) there were concerns that older software would need manual intervention to update the key, thus there was a need to make it into a big story to ensure appropriate folks would update the trust anchor (this turned out to be a non-issue).
- sybercecurity 2y agoI guess I misinterpreted it - sorry. It must say something that it isn't a big announcement anymore: either it has gotten to the point where people expect it (good operations), or people are expecting DNSSEC to go away (bad for DNSSEC). Still, with the reliance on the DNS for things, it would be nice to have it be secure. Or a DNS 2.0 that has solves a lot of the current issues with the protocol, but DNS has proven resilient and adaptable enough to continue working since RFC 1023 and 1035.
- tptacek 2y agoI disagree on securing the DNS (and about how we should go about it, if we must) but in any case, have no criticism about today's announcement.
- LeonM 2y agoWould have been nice if they would mention the key tag in the announcement. Its 38696 for those wondering.
- ognyankulev 2y agoI was hoping it's NIST ECDSA P-256 (algo 13) for smaller DNS packets, instead of what they did with continuing with RSA 2048 (algo 8).
- thayne 2y agoMy guess is they did that to be compatible with FIPS 140-2. FIPS 140-3 allows ECDSA, but isn't widely deployed yet (among sites required to comply), so using ECDSA would probably cause issues for government organizations that need to use FIPS and DNSSEC.
- dc396 2y agoNah. Changing algorithms is a bigger deal than rolling the key. They want the make sure rolling the key is a non-event before taking on changing algs. Changing the algorithm is being discussed however.
- bewaretheirs 2y agoMost of the big TLDs have already converted to algo 13 -- .org is still lingering on algo 8, but .com, .net, .edu, .gov have all converted, so a lot of the DNS traffic is using smaller signatures already. Changing the algorithm for the root is being studied - see for instance https://lists.icann.org/hyperkitty/list/ksk-rollover@icann.org/thread/ON52XZRGYLTQLAJD3K2P3W5IFJ3GNAIB/ https://lists.icann.org/hyperkitty/list/ksk-rollover@icann.o... ; I wouldn't be surprised to see an algo change as part of the next root key rollover.
- rasengan 2y agoWith a dedicated "key manager" on staff, this should be a much more secure process than it is currently.
- dc396 2y agoThere has been a dedicated key manager since before the first KSK roll. What about the current process isn't secure?