If PRC gets TW fabs intact (which presumes invasion successful), PRC semi engineers will be overseering to filter for loyalty. This isn't unique historic proble

If PRC gets TW fabs intact (which presumes invasion successful), PRC semi engineers will be overseering to filter for loyalty. This isn't unique historic problem, unfucking captured labour production from wartime spoils is a process. Nor do you need 100% TWnese loyalty, only group of compradors willing to be rewraded to drive internecine fracturing, of which there always are. >occupation Borders change through history because occupation frequently works. Chinese history is literally continuous record of various groups being occupied and absorbed. Missing in this context is PRC:TW has 50:1 manpower difference vs 4:1 in RU:UKR. Note that Tibet and Xinjiang has been thoroughly securitized, XJ have population approximate of TW. PRC simply has a lot of manpower advantage... millions of PLA/PAP to spare for occupation... and TW isn't a frontier province with difficult land logistics (PRC couldn't tame XJ/Tibet until they built out expensive rail infra) than ferrying troops/supplies via water (again if invasion successful). No one expects TW to rollover, but taming 25m people is well within PRC abilities. >operations PRC is basically the only actor with sufficient talent generation able to, and with intent to build out ENTIRE indigenous semi supply chain. Reverse engineering hardware is only piece of puzzle. Yes semi is particularly difficult, but PRC indy policy has fairly proven record of being able to indigenize tech within reasonable time frames, some take longer (i.e. turboject, semi). Large % of PRC of semi imports goes towards export, of which US/west captures significant share (IP etc)... PRC is going to lose $10 in iphone assembly fees while west loses $100s of BOM in semi components... the actual accounting is where fingers vs limbs becomes obvious. If Samsung can easily replace TSMC they wouldn't be shutting down leading edge semi lines right now (50% by end of year), not to mention there's chance Samsung fabs would go boom in broader TW conflict. >TSMC Arizona TSMC Arizona likely will still depend on many sole source suppliers on TW short/medium term (5-10 years). Talk about TSMC TW being unsustainable due to foreign imports of hardware/maintence etc also rings true for fabs on CONUS or elsewhere, good chance they'll stop operations without TW exclusive inputs that I'm sure many are trying to substitute as we speak. But again PRC is likely only country with industrial base to replicate entire semi supply chain in short/medium time frame... PRC only actor without projected semi talent shortfall. Hence depending on timeline/rate of indigenization, west will likely lose bulk of leading edge node advantage that where western incumbants derrive disproportionate value capture and significant net losers relative to PRC. Even if TSMC Arizona keeps chugging along, entire US Chips Act isn't projected to capture more than 10% of leading edge by 2030. US high tech losing 90% of leading edge hurts much more than PRC who are already largely denied ability to capture leading edge shares. Meanwhile PRC is rapidly expanding mature nodes, so we're looking at potential scenario where PRC continues to hobble along on 14nm+ while west loses 90% of leading edge nodes and ~60% of mature nodes (by 2030 PRC projected to have ~40% of mature nodes, TW ~40% of 60% remaining, i.e. 2/3 of mature nodes in western bloc). This dramatically closes semi production gap in PRC favour, west high end node gap becomes marginal, while PRC potentially 2:1 or 4:1 (if TW mature nodes captured) lead in mature node production. That's the numbers that determine winners/losers, or in this case relative loser (PRC fingers) / big losers (western limbs). PRC capturing no TSMC fabs but denying west said fabs is already nightmare scenario for west, PRC capturing is just bonus leverage, i.e. offer west continuity in global semi supply so everyone can transition into bloc supply chains for conceding on TW.