The attack surface from a browser is tiny. All you can do is call into ANGLE or Dawn through documented, well-defined and well-tested APIs. Or use things like c

The attack surface from a browser is tiny. All you can do is call into ANGLE or Dawn through documented, well-defined and well-tested APIs. Or use things like canvas and CSS animations, I suppose. Browser vendors care a lot about security, so they try to make sure these libraries are solid and you can't interact with the GPU in any other way. Native applications talk directly to the GPU's kernel-mode driver. The intended flow is that you call into the vendor's user-mode drivers - which are dynamic libraries in your application's address space - and they generate commands and execute ioctls on your application's behalf. The interface between these libraries and the KMD is usually undocumented, ill-defined and poorly tested. GPU vendors don't tend to care about security, so if the KMD doesn't properly validate some inputs, well, that issue can persist a long time. And if there's any bit of control stream that lets you tell the GPU to copy stuff between memory you own and memory you don't... I guess you get a very long security bulletin. The point is, webpages have access to a much smaller attack surface than native applications. It's unlikely anything in this bulletin is exploitable through a browser.