4 ms·
so then the attack becomes introducing enough error at critical counts such that it affects the result without being regarded as having been tampered with pret
by blibble 2y ago
so then the attack becomes introducing enough error at critical counts such that it affects the result without being regarded as having been tampered with
pretty easy if your company produced the machines
- Sparkle-san 2y agoHow would this defeat doing a statistical hand sampling of the ballots to verify the electronic counting is accurate?
- blibble 2y agowhat's the failure point? then you work inside that I know a guy who did this for a job for a company that produced food https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estimated_sign https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estimated_sign his entire job was to allow the company to push up as close to that line as possible without going over when checked randomly saving them tens of millions a year
- Sparkle-san 2y agoDepends on how many ballots you sample, but the number you could change would only matter in an extremely close election and in my state, if a vote is within 0.5%, it triggers an automatic recount. These systems have layers of auditing and validation to prevent these errors whether intentional or not.
- ninkendo 2y agoRandom audits can generally solve this. Take a random count from a random machine and validate that it matches the hand count. If I’m trying to rig an election I would have to be very reckless to just cross my fingers and hope that the systems I hacked aren’t audited. I’d have to bribe the auditors or something, and at that point it’s simpler to just bribe people anyway and not bother with the whole hacking part.
- irq-1 2y agoScanned paper ballots are changed all the time -- the manufacturer doesn't know that row 2 option 1 is a particular candidate. Authorities aren't stupid and know to change the ballots and test the machines. Teachers and students understand how this all works, so it has a lot of trust.