4 ms·

Pretty sure GP is saying a scantron-style one can still be flipped or offset at the destination. They use position on the ballot, not OCR, to determine what th

by Izkata 2y ago

Pretty sure GP is saying a scantron-style one can still be flipped or offset at the destination. They use position on the ballot, not OCR, to determine what the vote is.

flakeoil 2y ago
At least the source would be correct so 50% less chance of cheating i.e. the cheating did at least not occur while producing the vote.
floating-io 2y ago
It's not actually about how the ballot is interpreted by downstream hardware and software. That's a different issue. It's about the ability for the voter to determine that their own part of the process -- the recording of their own vote -- is done correctly in every respect. Each step of the system has to be verifiable as correct for the system to be trustworthy. As it stands right now, I cannot visually verify that my own vote produced a correct printed ballot. I have no way of doing that. This removes one of the most critical safeguards. If something in the software (malicious or otherwise) records an incorrect barcode, I have absolutely no way of knowing. That's a problem. Garbage in, garbage out.
- anon84873628 2y ago
  >It's not actually about how the ballot is interpreted by downstream hardware and software. That's a different issue. To me, this seems like the only part worth worrying about, and any solution to it should satisfy your concerns as well. Every ballot should have a UUID that the voter takes with them (or make it a hash of their voter registration number or something). As soon as the ballot is processed, the results are posted to a public place. Voters can then confirm their ballot was recorded accurately. This still doesn't tell you that all the internal variables were incremented correctly, but you can separately aggregate the publicly posted results and compare with the aggregate reported by the machine. The problem this still doesn't solve is electronically stuffing in fake ballots.
  - vel0city 2y ago
    > Every ballot should have a UUID that the voter takes with them (or make it a hash of their voter registration number or something). As soon as the ballot is processed, the results are posted to a public place. Voters can then confirm their ballot was recorded accurately. Opening the door for vote bribery or voter intimidation. $1,000 for every tag proving you voted for my candidate. If you don't prove you voted for my candidate, expect some retaliation!
    - anon84873628 2y ago
      You can already do that today by having people take a photo of their ballot. Or just buy their signed but otherwise blank mail-in ballot and complete it at gangster HQ. Or give them the money and don't require proof at all, because most people will just do what they agreed to do. This doesn't happen today because it isn't scalable and is easy to get caught and prosecuted. Electronic manipulation is more appealing because it does not require interacting with people.
      - vel0city 2y ago
        Taking a photo of the ballot is illegal. Also, one can just always strike the ballot before putting it in the machine after having the completed ballot. In some places of mail in ballots it's possible to cancel the mail in ballots and vote in person after.
        Izkata 2y ago
        It's different per state, most allow it: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/10/28/election-ballot-photo-laws-explained/75891964007/ https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/...
        anon84873628 2y ago
        And bribing people to vote is already illegal in the first place. Do things being illegal stop the behavior or not? You're arguing both sides of the coin at this point. Most people aren't going to try too hard to undermine or outsmart the gangster. Which is why, again, the perpetrator doesn't even need validation of how people actually voted. Vague threats will work just fine. In fact the gangster will still beat up a random sampling of the voters anyway.

by Izkata 2y ago

Pretty sure GP is saying a scantron-style one can still be flipped or offset at the destination. They use position on the ballot, not OCR, to determine what the vote is.

flakeoil 2y ago

At least the source would be correct so 50% less chance of cheating i.e. the cheating did at least not occur while producing the vote.

floating-io 2y ago

It's not actually about how the ballot is interpreted by downstream hardware and software. That's a different issue. It's about the ability for the voter to determine that their own part of the process -- the recording of their own vote -- is done correctly in every respect. Each step of the system has to be verifiable as correct for the system to be trustworthy. As it stands right now, I cannot visually verify that my own vote produced a correct printed ballot. I have no way of doing that. This removes one of the most critical safeguards. If something in the software (malicious or otherwise) records an incorrect barcode, I have absolutely no way of knowing. That's a problem. Garbage in, garbage out.

anon84873628 2y ago
>It's not actually about how the ballot is interpreted by downstream hardware and software. That's a different issue. To me, this seems like the only part worth worrying about, and any solution to it should satisfy your concerns as well. Every ballot should have a UUID that the voter takes with them (or make it a hash of their voter registration number or something). As soon as the ballot is processed, the results are posted to a public place. Voters can then confirm their ballot was recorded accurately. This still doesn't tell you that all the internal variables were incremented correctly, but you can separately aggregate the publicly posted results and compare with the aggregate reported by the machine. The problem this still doesn't solve is electronically stuffing in fake ballots.
- vel0city 2y ago
  > Every ballot should have a UUID that the voter takes with them (or make it a hash of their voter registration number or something). As soon as the ballot is processed, the results are posted to a public place. Voters can then confirm their ballot was recorded accurately. Opening the door for vote bribery or voter intimidation. $1,000 for every tag proving you voted for my candidate. If you don't prove you voted for my candidate, expect some retaliation!
  - anon84873628 2y ago
    You can already do that today by having people take a photo of their ballot. Or just buy their signed but otherwise blank mail-in ballot and complete it at gangster HQ. Or give them the money and don't require proof at all, because most people will just do what they agreed to do. This doesn't happen today because it isn't scalable and is easy to get caught and prosecuted. Electronic manipulation is more appealing because it does not require interacting with people.
    - vel0city 2y ago
      Taking a photo of the ballot is illegal. Also, one can just always strike the ballot before putting it in the machine after having the completed ballot. In some places of mail in ballots it's possible to cancel the mail in ballots and vote in person after.
      - Izkata 2y ago
        It's different per state, most allow it: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/10/28/election-ballot-photo-laws-explained/75891964007/ https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/...
      - anon84873628 2y ago
        And bribing people to vote is already illegal in the first place. Do things being illegal stop the behavior or not? You're arguing both sides of the coin at this point. Most people aren't going to try too hard to undermine or outsmart the gangster. Which is why, again, the perpetrator doesn't even need validation of how people actually voted. Vague threats will work just fine. In fact the gangster will still beat up a random sampling of the voters anyway.