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> What did it record? Who knows? How is it any different than traditional voting, where you drop your ballot into a black box and trust the poll workers would
by gruez 2y ago
> What did it record? Who knows?
How is it any different than traditional voting, where you drop your ballot into a black box and trust the poll workers would count it correctly?
You can do random spot checks select boxes to make sure the machine is tabulating correctly. If they're all correct, you can be reasonably sure the others are correct as well, unless your adversary has incredible luck.
- zmgsabst 2y agoHistorically, you open the box and count them in front of anyone who wants to watch — using enough polling sites that’s a relatively short task at each. Moving ballots, machine counting, etc are all relatively modern inventions — and seem to greatly weaken the consensus mechanism for little benefit.
- roenxi 2y agoIn traditional voting, there is a pretty decent chance you know the person who does the counting or can find someone in your community who can personally vouch for them. Living in my small town at one stage, I knew several of the tabulators personally and all of them by reputation. That is an extreme case, but even in a city these people are somewhat known quantities. With a voting machine that wasn't verified by a hand count it'd be relying on who-knows-who, who-knows-where with an uncertain risk profile.
- EGreg 2y agoSeriously? You are saying that you just trust some people not to manipulate the votes? Why not use a Merkle Tree or a Blockchain to verify that your vote was included in the total ? They were invented to remove trust in middlemen. Mutually distrusting parties can maintain the vote tallying. That’s how elections should be done.
- nicoburns 2y agoIn a hand count you might get the odd bad actor, but you're unlikely to get large scale systematic bias, which is much easier to introduce in a machine counting system.
- EGreg 2y ago“the odd bad actor” is incredibly optimistic, almost like there is already a bias against ever digitizing or using cryptography for adding security to a manual process with tons of ways to corrupt an election Elections around the world do not match this optimistic characterization. If they did, we’d all trust the outcomes of: Belarus’ election of Lukashenko Venezuela’s election of Maduro Crimean 2014 referendum Kosovo’s independence referendum (Note you probably think the last one was a lot more reliable than the first three — a lot of it has to do with living in a certain part of the world and believing the national media, which is only possible because the voting system and results can be so untrustworthy as to not allow regular people around the world to check anything, so propaganda is given free reign. Science and reliable knowledge usually doesn’t work this way.) In fact, let’s be clear… the “dictators” WANT the elections to have many ways to corrupt them, they WOULDN’T want a blockchain or merkle tree, that should tell you a lot And the “war hawks” in countries like USA who oppose their geopolitical rivals also want the elections and referendums to not be secure and clear, so they can cast doubt on them (eg Crimea) while at the same time claiming others (like Kosovo) are completely legit and justify unprecedented actions . As an aside, the vast majority of both Crimea[1] (94%) and Kosovo[2] (99%) that turned out to vote in referendums in 1991 voted for independence, so we all pretty much know what the public wanted later too, but it doesn’t affect the spin put on the later referendums and conflicts anyway If elections were secured by cryptography, the People around the world would have far more confidence, rather than listening to their own media propaganda spin the ambiguities, and the wars might even be avoided. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referendum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referend... 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Kosovan_independence_referendum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Kosovan_independence_refe...
- echoangle 2y agoThe advantage of just counting in public and having other people vouch is that it is easily understandable by everyone. If you use the blockchain, how many people can be convinced that the election was stolen with some techspeak? Do you think the average citizen understands enough cryptography to validate that the election was legit?
- prophesi 2y agoThis has me wonder if highschools should start teaching the basic concepts of cryptography so that we eventually do end up with a common understanding of blockchains, password managers, passkeys, or any other technologies that we end up using in our day-to-day lives for crucial tasks.
- runako 2y ago> common understanding of blockchains This is funny because as a CS grad, I cringe about 75% of the time when blockchain enthusiasts make pitches that are oblivious to the workings of blockchains, the tech underneath, and their alternatives. If the blockchain community can't understand blockchain, it's going to be nigh impossible to convey comprehension to the general public. The general public generally just wants the authorities whose job it is to manage voting to do so in a competent manner. It's worth noting that there's really only been one candidate for national election in modern history who has called into question the fairness of our elections. (And then only when he lost.) Most of us understand that the folks who work for the Secretaries of State are generally doing the best they can with the resources we provide, and we don't want to provide more resources so they can do a "better" job.
- echoangle 2y agoIt probably wouldn’t hurt, but you can’t really rely on Highschool education for election security. There are many people that don’t go to Highschool, and those that do probably forget half the stuff after a year. For an election, you want it to be basically obvious how it works in my opinion, anything that takes longer than 5 minutes to explain makes it easier to create doubt in the election.
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- harimau777 2y agoDoesn't the Blockchain, by design, record what is entered into it? So couldn't someone then figure out how you voted?
- Groxx 2y ago(without making any claim about "block chains for voting are good/bad") Not really. Generally if you want to privately check something like this, you encrypt it for the recipient (government), and sign it with something that only you know. So the contents are hidden from everyone and nobody knows anyone's signature, but you can prove that your item is in the list, unmodified, and is therefore counted. And then the chain would provide a quick way to check for "has not been modified since I checked", without needing to do the full check again.
- jasomill 2y agoAssuming uncontrolled public access to the blockchain, couldn't this also be used to prove to others that you voted "correctly", facilitating vote buying schemes?
- Groxx 2y agoParticularly if you do not publicly disclose the cert you signed it with: I'd be willing to bet there's some way to make it so you can produce a signing cert that'll claim you filled in any data you wish. E.g. have your signature data be a class of values based on vote possibilities, but have all produce the same final signature. You could produce anything for anyone that way. I'm not sure if that'd be "forward secrecy" or "deniable encryption" or what, but there are a variety of systems that do similar things. I am not a cryptographer and I don't know any concrete implementations that would have all the properties I want, but pieces of pretty much all things you could reasonably want in a voting system do already exist. And pretty often they can be layered together. The bigger problems in practice seem to be "people won't trust it" (which is defensible), "some of the fancier crypto is too new and not thoroughly proven" (which is very true, e.g. zero-knowledge proofs), and "implementers so far have been stunningly incompetent" (undeniable). (edit: or I guess more easily, just sign the data after encryption, and throw away your encryption key. then you can claim whatever you like - it's encrypted, they can't know, and you can still show that it wasn't changed)
- roenxi 2y agoThat seems like it'd be impossible to implement. Either I'd have a record that I voted with no way to confirm who my vote was counted for, or I'd be able to prove that I voted for a specific candidate which opens a Pandora's box of problems (either coercion for voting for the wrong candidate or bribes for provably voting for a specific candidate). I mean sure, if someone can come up with a workable blockchain-based system that would be good, but I don't think that is an in-practice option on the table right now.
- EGreg 2y agoFirst of all zero-knowledge proofs allow you to verify stuff without being able to prove it to others But honestly, I think the whole idea of being able to prove how you voted being dangerous is overblown. The same people who say you don’t need an ID to vote because it’s a non-issue then come up with fantasy scenarios of masses of people being forced to prove how they voted, or bribed to do it LOL.
- runako 2y ago> masses of people being forced to prove how they voted, or bribed to do it LOL Would you believe that in some households, the husband considers his wife's vote as his property? And that there are lots of households like this? It doesn't have to be a singular mass of people being coerced by a single entity. Lots of wives being coerced by lots of husbands is also corrosive to elections.
- Slava_Propanei 2y ago[dead]
- nemomarx 2y agoI don't know if there's a lot of bribery risk, but a family member asking to see how you voted has plenty of room for coercion and abuse. It seems good that no one but you can know how you voted in principle.
- mulmen 2y ago
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- tedunangst 2y agoWhat do you do when you know the vote counter and don't trust them?
- roenxi 2y agoWhat do you do when you live in North Korea and are worried about an elections integrity? At some point the answer is you survive as best you can. But to fight corruption you need more transparency and to increase the costs of conspiracies, ie, to head in the opposite direction of voting machines.
- vel0city 2y ago> In traditional voting, there is a pretty decent chance you know the person who does the counting or can find someone in your community who can personally vouch for them. Voting in my area is managed by my county. There's 1.1M people in my county and it's not even the biggest in my state. I'm supposed to personally know all of the few hundred people working the election out of 1.1M spread across 2,200sq km?
- roenxi 2y agoNo.
- BurningFrog 2y agoIn a serious voting system the paper ballots are saved and can be recounted by hand. I've worked in elections in Sweden, and all elections are recounted at least twice, by different people.
- wannacboatmovie 2y agoThe issue in the US is compounded further as running elections is left up to not only the states, but the individual municipalities in those states and typically run at the county level. Each with their own rules, whether or not ID verification is mandatory or literally illegal, style of voting (mail vs in-person), ballot design/UX, what languages the ballots are in (are ballots in Sweden in anything but Swedish?) and mutually incompatible equipment. There are thousands, if not tens of thousands, of ballot designs in use for the current election. When viewing this at a macro level for electing the office of the President, it seems absolutely insane.
- dghlsakjg 2y agoOn the flip side; it makes it incredibly difficult to pull off wide scale fraud. Instead of having to compromise a single system, you are forced to compromise dozens or hundreds of systems run by people with opposing ideologies
- justsomehnguy 2y agoOn the flip side: it makes it incredibly difficult to notice you were a subject of a wide scale fraud. You need to know an every single system and you can't look for discrepancies what would be obvious in the environment with a standardised system.
- pstrateman 2y agoWide scale fraud isn't necessary when elections are decided by 10k votes.
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- tsimionescu 2y agoIn traditional voting, the votes get counted by humans, supervised by other humans. If you want to spend the time and energy, you can be one of those humans. It's completely different from a machine count. Humans have human failure modes, which are easily accounted for. Machines have random failure modes, and complex ways of being attacked. And all of the machines can be wrong in one direction at the same time, which is impossible for human counters. Even random spot checks don't work for machines if the machine has some way of detecting it is being checked.
- gruez 2y ago>Even random spot checks don't work for machines if the machine has some way of detecting it is being checked. That's theoretically a possibility, but it's trivially defeated by choosing which ballot boxes to spot check after the machines have finished counting.
- tsimionescu 2y agoFair enough, but there is also another problem. What happens if you detect a discrepancy in one or two places, but good results in many others? Do you still issue a full recount of all places that the machine was used? If not, then an adversary can still subtly modify the results of the election, at least probabilistically.