> Downside of trading privacy for security: > Transparent WWW caching is one example of a pro-privacy setup that used to be possible and is no longer feasible

> Downside of trading privacy for security: > Transparent WWW caching is one example of a pro-privacy setup that used to be possible and is no longer feasible due to pervasive TLS. What? You're kidding. If we didn't have pervasive TLS we'd have neither privacy nor security. Sure, a caching proxy would add a measure of privacy, but not relative to the proxy's operator, and the proxy's operator would be the ISP, and the ISP has access to all sorts of metadata about you. Therefore pervasive TLS did not hurt privacy, and it did improve security. You're making the same mistake as Meredith Whittaker. It's a category mistake. > Other example: the Mac I'm typing this on phones home every app I open in the name of “““protecting””” me from malware. What does this have to do with secure cryptography? That's what TFA is about. You are conflating security as-in cryptography with security as-in operating system security. More category errors. These are serious errors because if we accept this nonsense then we accept weak cryptography -- that's DJB's point.