4 ms·

Strava is a fitness app. So, apprently, the security detachment of political figures tends to use the app, presumably because they're into fitness and keep in s

Strava is a fitness app. So, apprently, the security detachment of political figures tends to use the app, presumably because they're into fitness and keep in shape, and their location can be tracked through the app. As the security detachment tend to travel with the people they protect, political leaders locations can be inferred. The article talks about body guards not being allowed to use social media/apps while on the job, they allow for provisions on use when not on active duty. So, I guess, the guards get a day off, use the app, wherever they are, broadcasting their location. Crazy stuff.

netsharc 2y ago
Yeah, the targetting isn't that difficult, I guess. If you know crown prince Akeem Joffer was in New York 5 days ago, and is in Paris 3 days ago, you can probably diligently query Strava users who weren't in New York for a long time but showed up 5 days ago, and see if they showed up in Paris 3 days ago, and boom, you've found a member of his entourage. Even if they use the anonymizing feature that masks their start/end points, if you find a few other members, you could be able to triangulate a big hotel near them and guess that that's where the crown prince stayed... and the next time you hear he's coming to NY/Paris, you have this information.
kkielhofner 2y ago
Shouldn't be much of a surprise, this made news back in 2018 when the same was realized with soldiers and secret military bases: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret-us-army-bases https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki...
loeg 2y ago
More specifically, it's a social network for sharing workout data. Sharing data is like, first and foremost what it's about. It has the same privacy controls you'd expect of social networks (public/friends/private both globally and per post/activity) as well as some that are special to a location-sharing app (hidden addresses). This was either a gap in social media policy set for the guards, or a violation of that policy on the part of the guards.

netsharc 2y ago

Yeah, the targetting isn't that difficult, I guess. If you know crown prince Akeem Joffer was in New York 5 days ago, and is in Paris 3 days ago, you can probably diligently query Strava users who weren't in New York for a long time but showed up 5 days ago, and see if they showed up in Paris 3 days ago, and boom, you've found a member of his entourage. Even if they use the anonymizing feature that masks their start/end points, if you find a few other members, you could be able to triangulate a big hotel near them and guess that that's where the crown prince stayed... and the next time you hear he's coming to NY/Paris, you have this information.

kkielhofner 2y ago

Shouldn't be much of a surprise, this made news back in 2018 when the same was realized with soldiers and secret military bases: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret-us-army-bases https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki...

loeg 2y ago

More specifically, it's a social network for sharing workout data. Sharing data is like, first and foremost what it's about. It has the same privacy controls you'd expect of social networks (public/friends/private both globally and per post/activity) as well as some that are special to a location-sharing app (hidden addresses). This was either a gap in social media policy set for the guards, or a violation of that policy on the part of the guards.