4 ms·

I don't understand why moving to system designs that require exploitation of the accessibility layer to turn a device into something semi functional. Those OS

I don't understand why moving to system designs that require exploitation of the accessibility layer to turn a device into something semi functional. Those OS go out of the way preventing features that hinder usefulness of the devices. Such as recording phone calls. Allowing the blocking of network IP addresses and domains. While supplying monolithic integration that is limited to all but the OS maintainers. Google dialer does not allow for integration of 3rd party contacts. It is built around Google remote storage. Apple Messenger doesn't allow for conversing with non Apple device users except for insecure text messaging while promoting cyber bullying with green vs blue text. Another security and business risk of using Google or Apple for content storage with limited recourse when they lock out our accounts.

kaoD 2y ago
There's a middle ground where apps are sandboxed but you're still in full control... But of course OS vendors will not allow that, so we're just daydreaming here.
miki123211 2y ago
> We need to give up on the UAC/sudo/etc. style of user based privilege escalation and instead sandbox apps, not users, just like Android and iOS do. > Those OS go out of the way preventing features that hinder usefulness of the devices. But one isn't necessarily synonymous with the other. Mac OS is slowly going in this direction. Their policy these days is that apps shouldn't be able to do dangerous things by default, but should have the ability to ask for any specific privilege, if and when they need it. Instead of getting a generic "this app wants admin privileges" popup, you get a "this app wants access to the files in your Documents folder" popup. This makes a lot more sense, lets you deny specific permissions while allowing others, and actually tells the user what the app needs the privileges for. The more dangerous the privilege, the more involved the setup process is. The most dangerous privilege of all, that of installing your own kernel extensions, which can do (almost) everything and are your final option when there's truly no API for what you need to do, is gated behind a reboot into recovery mode. This is combined with new, more secure APIs, so that privilege escalation is often entirely unnecessary. For example, most things that were formerly accomplished via kernel drivers can now be done with sandboxed, userspace processes, and there are APIs like the photo picker, where the user picks what photos to share in a system-managed window, that require no extra privilege because the system knows that the user just clicked on a photo in the context of that app.
layer8 2y ago
In the case of Windows, a lot is about compatibility. You can design a different system, but then a lot of existing software that users care about won’t properly function on it anymore. However, if you read the article, the vulnerability is enabled by a race condition in a Windows security component, so really just a bug here, even if Microsoft is trying to deflect from that.
acka 2y ago
Recording phone calls is possible in principle. The reason that it is not available on some devices or in some regions is that there are legal requirements which manufacturers have to adhere to in order to get their devices certified, i.e. in some countries it is illegal to record phone calls, in others explicit permission needs to be given, reason for manufacturers to take the safe route w.r.t. liability and disable it in those countries too, or even globally.
- xp84 2y ago
  That all may be true, but I deeply hate having the devices I supposedly own make all these determinations for me. If I buy a hammer, it doesn’t just disappear up if I try to use it to break a window that doesn’t belong to me. It’s my responsibility to use it according to the law or possibly face the consequences. If I record calls in a state with the idiotic all-party consent law, for my own records, I can’t use them in court, but it’s a victimless crime if I just use them to say, keep track of what the incompetent people at the health insurance company told me, and I wish I lived in a world where that was my risk to take and my business only.

kaoD 2y ago

There's a middle ground where apps are sandboxed but you're still in full control... But of course OS vendors will not allow that, so we're just daydreaming here.

miki123211 2y ago

> We need to give up on the UAC/sudo/etc. style of user based privilege escalation and instead sandbox apps, not users, just like Android and iOS do. > Those OS go out of the way preventing features that hinder usefulness of the devices. But one isn't necessarily synonymous with the other. Mac OS is slowly going in this direction. Their policy these days is that apps shouldn't be able to do dangerous things by default, but should have the ability to ask for any specific privilege, if and when they need it. Instead of getting a generic "this app wants admin privileges" popup, you get a "this app wants access to the files in your Documents folder" popup. This makes a lot more sense, lets you deny specific permissions while allowing others, and actually tells the user what the app needs the privileges for. The more dangerous the privilege, the more involved the setup process is. The most dangerous privilege of all, that of installing your own kernel extensions, which can do (almost) everything and are your final option when there's truly no API for what you need to do, is gated behind a reboot into recovery mode. This is combined with new, more secure APIs, so that privilege escalation is often entirely unnecessary. For example, most things that were formerly accomplished via kernel drivers can now be done with sandboxed, userspace processes, and there are APIs like the photo picker, where the user picks what photos to share in a system-managed window, that require no extra privilege because the system knows that the user just clicked on a photo in the context of that app.

layer8 2y ago

In the case of Windows, a lot is about compatibility. You can design a different system, but then a lot of existing software that users care about won’t properly function on it anymore. However, if you read the article, the vulnerability is enabled by a race condition in a Windows security component, so really just a bug here, even if Microsoft is trying to deflect from that.

acka 2y ago

Recording phone calls is possible in principle. The reason that it is not available on some devices or in some regions is that there are legal requirements which manufacturers have to adhere to in order to get their devices certified, i.e. in some countries it is illegal to record phone calls, in others explicit permission needs to be given, reason for manufacturers to take the safe route w.r.t. liability and disable it in those countries too, or even globally.

xp84 2y ago
That all may be true, but I deeply hate having the devices I supposedly own make all these determinations for me. If I buy a hammer, it doesn’t just disappear up if I try to use it to break a window that doesn’t belong to me. It’s my responsibility to use it according to the law or possibly face the consequences. If I record calls in a state with the idiotic all-party consent law, for my own records, I can’t use them in court, but it’s a victimless crime if I just use them to say, keep track of what the incompetent people at the health insurance company told me, and I wish I lived in a world where that was my risk to take and my business only.